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QUESTION PRESENTED 
Whether the collateral order doctrine permits the 
immediate appeal of a district court order denying 
appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).
ii 
 
  .1 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Petitioner in this case is Sai, an individual.  
Petitioner was the plaintiff and appellant below.  Sai 
is Petitioner’s full legal name. 
The Respondent is the Transportation Security 
Administration, which was defendant and appellee 
below.  
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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Petitioner Sai respectfully petitions this Court for 
a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 
this case.  
OPINIONS BELOW 
The order of the D.C. Circuit dismissing Sai’s 
appeal is unreported and is reproduced at page 1a of 
the appendix to this petition (“App.”).  The order of the 
D.C. Circuit denying Sai’s petition for initial hearing 
en banc to review whether the Court had jurisdiction 
under the collateral order doctrine is reproduced at 
page 3a of the appendix, and the minute order denying 
appointed to counsel by the United States District 
Court of the District of Columbia is reproduced at 
page 4a.   
JURISDICTION 
Sai timely appealed the district court’s January 7, 
2016 order denying his motion to appoint counsel on 
January 8, 2016.  The D.C. Circuit denied Sai’s 
petition for initial hearing en banc on March 11, 2016, 
and dismissed the appeal on June 6, 2016 for lack of 
jurisdiction.  App. 1a-3a.  This Court has jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED 
TITLE 28—JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL 
PROCEDURE 
§ 1915. Proceedings in forma pauperis 
* * * 
(e)(1) The court may request an attorney to represent 
any person unable to afford counsel. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner Sai filed a suit challenging repeated 
violations by the Transportation Safety Administra-
tion of the Freedom of Information Act and the 
Privacy Act.  Complaint at 1. 
In the district court, Sai moved for leave to file a 
request ex parte and under seal for in forma pauperis 
status and the appointment of counsel pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).  Sai requested to file his support-
ing affidavits under seal for privacy concerns. Mar. 13, 
2014 Motion at 1-2.  The court denied his motion the 
same day.  Sai later tried again, orally moving for 
appointment of counsel, and incorporating by refer-
ence filings in another case resolved just prior in the 
same court that day.  App. 4a.  The district court 
denied the motion for the same reasons as in Sai’s 
other case, id.,—namely that Sai must submit an 
affidavit of his assets for the public record.  App. 53a.   
Sai appealed the denial of counsel to the D.C. 
Circuit, and the D.C. Circuit issued an order to show 
cause why the case should not be dismissed for a lack 
of jurisdiction.  Order to Show Cause.  In response Sai 
filed a petition for initial hearing en banc, conceding 
that the D.C. Circuit already had decided that orders 
denying counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) are not 
appealable under the collateral order doctrine.  The 
court denied the petition, App. 3a, and dismissed the 
case, App.1a.  This petition followed. 
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
I. THE CIRCUITS ARE DIVIDED ON WHETHER 
ORDERS DENYING COUNSEL ARE 
IMMEDIATELY APPEALABLE 
Over thirty years ago, Justices White and 
Blackmun dissented from a denial of certiorari on 
whether denial of appointment of counsel orders were 
immediately appealable collateral orders, asserting 
that the issue must be resolved by this Court because 
of its importance and the developing division among 
circuits.  Welch v. Smith, 484 U.S. 903 (1987) (White, 
J. dissent from denial of writ of certiorari).  The 
collateral order doctrine applies appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to collateral orders and allows 
review of district court orders that: (1) “conclusively 
determine the disputed question;” (2) “resolve an 
important issue completely separate from the merits 
of the action;” and (3) are “effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. 
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (listing the Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) 
factors).  Three decades after Justice White’s 
prescient dissent, all thirteen circuits have now 
weighed in and remain intractably divided.  The 
circuits holding the issue is immediately appealable 
correctly apply the collateral order doctrine. 
A. The Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal 
Circuits Hold Orders Denying Counsel Under 
§ 1915(e) Are Immediately Appealable. 
The Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal 
Circuits all have held that orders denying 
appointment of counsel are immediately appealable.  
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Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc’y, 662 F.2d 1301, 1306 
(9th Cir. 1981). 
In Hudak v. Curators of University of Missouri, 
the Eighth Circuit noted that it has held that a denial 
of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 19151 and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) is immediately appealable because it 
causes irreparable harm to the plaintiff on appeal of 
the final judgment.  586 F.2d 105, 106 (8th Cir. 1978) 
(per curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1978); see 
also Slaughter v. City of Maplewood, 731 F.2d 587, 
588 (8th Cir. 1984).  The Eighth Circuit has declined 
to extend its holding in Slaughter to habeas cases, 
however, on the ground that the district court must 
evaluate the merits of a plaintiff’s case to determine if 
counsel is appropriate.  Pena-Calleja v. Ring, 720 F.3d 
988, 989 (8th Cir. 2013).  In habeas cases, unlike in 
denial of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), the court evaluates the 
plaintiff’s likelihood of success—not just potential 
merit—when determining whether counsel is 
appropriate, so the counsel determination is not 
separable from the merits.  Id. 
The Federal Circuit agrees that orders denying 
the appointment of counsel under § 1915 satisfy 
Cohen and are immediately appealable collateral 
orders.  Lariscey v. United States, 861 F.2d 1267, 1269 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (highlighting that decisions of counsel 
were “conclusively answered” even if decided without 
prejudice). 
                                            
1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) was redesignated §1915(e) with changes 
not relevant to this matter.  U.S. Pub. L. 104-134 §804(a) (1996). 
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In Spanos v. Penn Central Transportation 
Company, the Third Circuit determined that orders 
denying counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 are 
immediately appealable.  470 F.2d 806, 807 n.3 (3d 
Cir. 1972).  The Third Circuit has emphasized the 
separability of counsel orders made in civil cases.  Ray 
v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(expanding on the Spanos holding).  These orders are 
separable because they are not dependent on the 
merits of a plaintiff’s case.  See id. at 477. 
The Fifth Circuit similarly held that orders 
denying counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(f)(1) are immediately appealable.  See 
Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308 
(5th Cir. 1977); see also Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d 
405, 409 (5th Cir. 1985).  The Fifth Circuit has ruled 
differently in cases not decided pursuant to the 
statutes at issue in this case.  In, for example, 
products liability suits or cases brought pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 2254, the district court determination of 
whether plaintiff receives counsel is tied to whether 
the court believes plaintiff will be successful on the 
merits.  See Marler v. Adonis, 997 F.2d 1141, 1143 
(5th Cir. 1993) (declining to extend Caston to products 
liability suits because “counsel accept products 
liability cases on contingent fees, even in the weakest 
of cases”). 
The Ninth Circuit, as has previously been noted 
by this Court, has created a complicated 
interpretation of whether denial of counsel orders are 
immediately appealable.  See Welch v. Smith, 484 
U.S. 903 (1987) (White, J. dissent from denial of writ 
of certiorari).  Orders denying requests for counsel 
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under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(5)(f)(1)(B) are immediately 
appealable in the Ninth Circuit.  Bradshaw, 662 F.2d 
1301.  The court distinguishes requests for counsel 
made in habeas proceedings, because in these cases 
the court is required to look to the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claim; therefore, the orders are not 
separable under the collateral appeal doctrine.  
Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 953-54 (9th Cir. 
1983). 
B. The First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits Hold Orders 
Denying Counsel Are Not Immediately 
Appealable. 
The First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits all erroneously relied on 
this Court’s holding in Firestone to determine that 
orders denying counsel are not immediately 
appealable as collateral orders.  See Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981) (holding 
that orders disqualifying counsel in civil cases are not 
immediately appealable under the collateral order 
doctrine). 
In the First Circuit, orders denying counsel under 
28 U.S.C. § 1915) are not immediately appealable, 
because the court reasoned that the orders are not 
conclusively determined.  Appleby v. Meachum, 696 
F.2d 145, 146-47 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam).  The 
court cited to the theory that a district court can 
reassess a plaintiff’s need for counsel throughout the 
litigation and that these orders are reviewable on 
appeal.  See id. 
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The Second Circuit also holds that orders denying 
counsel are not immediately appealable.  See Miller v. 
Pleasure, 425 F.2d 1205, 1205 (2d Cir. 1970) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 880 (1970), overruling 
Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283, 283 (2d Cir. 1961), 
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 964 (1962).  The court reversed 
the its prior holding in Miller on the rationale that 
there was a growing burden of appeals, and denial of 
counsel does not in itself destroy a plaintiff’s claim.  
See Miller, 425 F.2d at 1205.  Instead, denial of 
counsel simply denies an “added facility in the 
prosecution of his claim.”  Id.   
Despite the law in the Second Circuit that denial 
of appointment of counsel orders are not final orders, 
the court evaluated a denial of request for counsel in 
a Title VII case “in the interest of judicial economy.”  
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Charles W. Sears Real Estate, 
Inc., 865 F.2d 22, 23 (2d Cir. 1988).  The court allows 
the interlocutory appeal of orders denying IFP status, 
and noted that “the same factors” are relevant to 
appellate review of denial of counsel orders.  Id. 
The Sixth Circuit holds that requests for counsel 
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) and § 1983 are 
inherently not final decisions.  Henry v. City of Detroit 
Manpower Dep’t, 763 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1985) (en 
banc) (citing that because of the timing of orders 
denying counsel—before the complaint, the record 
development, etc.—the orders “should be presumed 
tentative”).  The court relied on Firestone and 
Flanagan to determine orders disqualifying counsel in 
criminal cases are not separate from the merits.  See 
id.at 762. 
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The Seventh Circuit determined that orders 
denying counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for products 
liability claims are not appealable because they are in 
essence reviewable after final judgment.  Randle v. 
Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 
1981).  Quoting Firestone, the Seventh Circuit 
emphasized that orders “at worst … merely result[] in 
the delay caused by the need to retry the case.”  See 
id. at 1066-67.  
The Tenth Circuit also relied on Firestone for the 
conclusion that orders denying counsel under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915 meet the Cohen conclusiveness and 
separability prongs, but are “fully reviewable after 
final judgment,” and therefore “a single controversy.”.  
Cotner v. Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1392 (10th Cir. 1981) 
(per curiam) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 
U.S. 156, 170 (1974)). 
The Eleventh Circuit determined that denials of 
counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 are not immediately 
appealable.  Holt v. Ford, 862 F.2d 850, 851 (11th Cir. 
1989) (en banc) (“such an order fails all three prongs 
of the Cohen test”). It later held that Holt implicitly 
overruled Caston, and seeing no basis for 
distinguishing denial of counsel in § 1983 cases from 
Title VII cases, extended this holding to 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5 as well. Hodges v. Department of Corrections, 
State of Ga., 895 F. 2d 1360 (11th Cir. 1990) (per 
curiam). 
The D.C. Circuit was the last circuit to address 
this issue, and determined that orders denying 
counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)are not 
immediately appealable.  Ficken v. Alvarez, 146 F.3d 
978, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  The court reasoned that 
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these orders are not conclusive and that they are 
reviewable on appeal (and by the district court 
throughout trial).  See id. at 980-81. 
II. THE CIRCUITS THAT HOLD THESE ORDERS 
ARE IMMEDIATELY APPEALABLE ARE 
CORRECT. 
The circuits allowing the immediate appeal of 
denial of appointment of counsel orders better apply 
the collateral order doctrine, as they evaluate the 
reality of what happens to an indigent plaintiff’s case 
when counsel is denied. 
First, orders denying counsel are conclusively 
determined.  Conclusively determined orders are ones 
that are the district court’s “last word on the subject.”  
Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1306.  Final orders include 
orders made without prejudice.  See Spanos v. Penn 
Ctrl. Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806, 807 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972).  
An order denying counsel is a complete, formal court 
order that impacts all future proceedings. 
Some circuits have held that because district 
courts can reassess a plaintiff’s need for counsel 
throughout litigation, orders denying counsel are not 
conclusive.  See, e.g. Appleby, 146 F.3d at 982.  This 
evaluation incorrectly interprets the conclusively 
determined prong.  When the district court deter-
mines that a plaintiff is not entitled to counsel, the 
denial is a complete and formal order that governs all 
further proceedings.  Lariscey, 861 F.2d at 1269.  
Therefore such orders are effectively conclusive for 
the duration of the case.  Although the orders are 
potentially subject to revision by the district court, for 
example if a meritorious case begins to develop, in 
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practice courts rarely grant plaintiffs counsel after an 
initial denial.  It is also practically unlikely that an 
indigent plaintiff will develop a meritorious case 
without the assistance of counsel, particularly when 
the case involves complex legal issues. 
Second, orders denying counsel are separable 
from the merits of an action.  An order is separable if 
the district court does not have to get enmeshed in the 
case’s substantive issues, but instead minimally 
inquires into the merits of the action.  See Henry, 763 
F.2d at 767 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1036 
(1985).  This includes cases where the underlying 
issue in the order is of “critical importance” to the 
litigation.  Id. 
In Firestone, this Court left the question for 
another day of whether an order disqualifying counsel 
in a civil case is separable from the merits.  Firestone, 
449 U.S. at 376.  Three years later, this Court 
determined that orders disqualifying counsel were not 
immediately appealable in a criminal case because the 
orders were not separable.  Flanagan v. United States, 
465 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1984).  To determine whether 
counsel should be disqualified, the court must 
determine whether the defense was impaired, which 
substantively analyzes the viability of a defendant’s 
claim.  Id.  It is clear that orders disqualifying counsel 
are not independent from the merits of the case.  In 
evaluating an order denying appointment of counsel 
on appeal, however, the appellate court would not 
need to make any substantive evaluation of the 
plaintiff’s case. 
Conversely, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the district 
court’s determination of whether a plaintiff is entitled 
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to counsel is wholly unrelated to the substance of 
plaintiff’s claim, or to any issues that occur during 
proceedings.  In requests for counsel made pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the plaintiff’s indigence is the 
only relevant fact.  The circuits have created different 
standards for what circumstances are just.  For 
example, in the Eighth Circuit the determination of 
whether plaintiff is entitled to counsel depends on 
whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie claim, 
the plaintiff has tried and failed to retain counsel, and 
whether the “nature of the litigation is such that 
plaintiff as well as the court will benefit from the 
assistance of counsel.”  Nelson v. Redfield Lithograph 
Printing, 728 F.2d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 1984). 
In general, entitlement to counsel is dependent on 
whether plaintiff’s claim is potentially meritorious, 
not on an actual determination of the merits.  See, e.g., 
Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1319 (discussing that plaintiffs 
with potentially non-meritorious claims are 
sometimes unable to find counsel, as “the provision for 
appointment of counsel would be wholly unnecessary 
if all meritorious claims attracted retained counsel”); 
see also Caston, 556 F.2d at 1308 (comparing denials 
of IFP status, which are immediately appealable 
collateral orders that do not evaluate the claim’s 
merits, to denials of counsel).  When the district court 
does evaluate the merits, it is not a problematic 
assessment of the validity of plaintiff’s claim; instead, 
the district court merely assures the claim is not 
“patently frivolous.”  Poindexter v. Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation, 737 F.2d 1173, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  
The court need only determine that “the plaintiff 
appears to have some chance of prevailing” for the 
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litigant to meet the “meritorious” factor of the test.  Id. 
at 1187. 
Finally, orders denying counsel are not effectively 
reviewable upon final appeal, because there are no 
other practical remedies available to a plaintiff once 
counsel is denied.  For immediately appealable orders, 
“appellate review must occur before trial to be fully 
effective.”  Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 266.  Here, whether 
the plaintiff can benefit from the appointment of 
counsel is essential to a pro se litigant’s case.  If the 
plaintiff is entitled to counsel, “he needs such counsel 
now” to benefit at trial; otherwise, the plaintiff will be 
forced to litigate the complex legal system without 
guidance.  Lariscey, 861 F.2d at 1270. 
If appeal of denials of counsel await the outcome 
of proceedings, only four outcomes are possible.  The 
first and most likely outcome is that the pro se 
plaintiff will not be able to pursue complex claims 
alone and will simply give up.  The second outcome is 
that the pro se plaintiff engages in the full gamut of 
proceedings without the assistance of counsel, and if 
the plaintiff is successful on the subsequent appeal, 
the entire prior proceedings “would be declared a 
nullity: not an efficient use of either personal or 
judicial resources.”  Id.  Third, in the exceedingly rare 
circumstance, the pro se plaintiff may find success.  
Fourth, the pro se litigant could pursue claims to 
conclusion and lose on appeal. 
This Court determined in Firestone that orders 
disqualifying counsel are not immediately appealable 
because, in order to be unreviewable, “denial of 
immediate review would render impossible any 
review whatsoever.”  449 U.S. at 376 (quoting United 
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States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971)).  
Disqualification of counsel is distinguishable from 
denial of counsel, however, in part because “a decision 
on appellant’s need for counsel must be made before 
the trial if it is to be of any practical effect to him.”  
Ray, 640 F.2d at 477.  Additionally, disqualification is 
distinguishable because when counsel is denied, there 
are no other practical remedies available to plaintiff.  
See Randle, 664 F.2d at 1068 (Swygert, J., dissenting).  
Finally, the potential harm from disqualification is 
not as great as outright denial of counsel, as denial 
effectively limits litigants’ access to the courts.  See id. 
The importance of having counsel at the 
beginning of litigation highlights the need for 
immediate reviewability of denial of counsel orders.  
Slaughter, 731 F.2d  at 589 (finding that the harm 
from denying appointment of counsel “can be 
irreparable”); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 756 
(8th Cir. 1971).  A pro se plaintiff does not necessarily 
understand the complexity of the law or possible 
errors committed at trial that must be preserved for 
proper appeal.  See Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1311. 
Many of the circuits that determined that denial 
of counsel orders are not collateral orders base their 
holdings on the reviewability prong.  For example, the 
First Circuit has held the pro se plaintiff can “persist 
long enough [in his case] to raise the issue of 
appointed counsel along with any other issues he 
preserves in his appeal from a final judgment.”  
Appleby, 696 F.2d at 146 (1988).  This determination 
was over thirty years ago—as were many circuit 
determinations—and litigation has only gotten more 
expensive, complicated, and time consuming.  A 
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correct application of the collateral order doctrine, 
therefore, allows the interlocutory appeal of orders 
denying the appointment of counsel. 
III. THIS CASE PRESENTS A QUESTION OF 
EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE. 
A. After three decades of confusion, circuits 
remain in conflict with each other and amongst 
themselves. 
Denying appointment of counsel for indigent 
plaintiffs certainly hinders a plaintiff’s case, but 
refusing to hear the appeal from such a denial often 
hobbles a case before it ever has a chance to get out of 
the gate.  The issue of whether a denial of appoint-
ment of counsel order is immediately appealable as a 
collateral order has confused the circuits, caused line 
drawing between statutes, and caused one circuit to 
switch positions in less than a decade.  Circuit courts 
need guidance from this Court regarding the proper 
analysis of the collateral appeal doctrine in regards to 
indigent plaintiffs and their denied appointment of 
counsel.   
As previously mentioned, circuits remain divided 
as to whether plaintiffs can immediately appeal the 
denial of appointed counsel, which creates vastly 
different court determinations based on which federal 
court the plaintiff brings suit.  Five circuits hold that 
such denials are immediately appealable, and eight 
circuits hold that the denials do not satisfy the 
collateral order doctrine.   
Although this confusion stems from the early 
1980s when this issue was first litigated, determining 
whether the denial of appointment of counsel is 
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immediately appealable has continued to plague the 
courts.  See, e.g., Perkinson v. White, 569 F. App’x 152 
(4th Cir. 2014) (holding that denial of appointment of 
counsel orders under § 1915 are not appealable as a 
collateral order); Christian v. Commerce Bank, N.A., 
No. 4:14CV00201 AGF, 2014 WL 2218726 (E.D. Mo. 
May 29, 2014) (holding that same orders under § 1915 
are immediately appealable as collateral orders).  
Without a determinative indication by this Court, the 
circuits will continue to diverge in their application of 
the collateral order doctrine, providing a disservice to 
indigent plaintiffs in the process.   
Apart from the confusion between the circuits, 
this issue has created division within the circuits 
themselves, causing judges to invert on position and 
craft minute distinctions between statutes.   
In the Second Circuit, the court first held in Miller 
that a plaintiff could immediately appeal the denial of 
appointed counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).  296 
F.2d at 283 (affirming district court’s decision).  
However, a mere nine years later, a different panel re-
versed position in the same case.  See Miller, 425 F.2d 
at 1206.  The court held that a plaintiff could not 
immediately appeal such orders because it not only 
required the court to get involved in the merits of the 
case, but also contributed to the increased burden on 
the appellate court system in the last decade.  Id.   
The Ninth Circuit provides just one example of 
line drawing between statutes when determining 
whether the denial of appointed counsel is immediate-
ly appealable.  In Bradshaw, the court allowed the 
immediate appeal of a denial of appointment of 
counsel order when brought as part of a Title VII suit.  
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662 F.2d at 1320 (allowing appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(f)(1)(B)).  But the court refused to extend the 
holding to habeas proceedings in Weygandt, 718 F.2d 
at 954 (distinguishing habeas proceedings from Title 
VII suits because of separability concerns).  The Fifth 
and Eighth Circuits have similar distinctions.  
Compare Caston, 556 F.2d at 1308 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(allowing appeal in Title VII cases), with Marler, 997 
F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1993) (refusing to extend Caston 
to product liability suits); compare Slaughter, 731 
F.2d at 588 (allowing immediate appeal for Title VII), 
with Pena-Calleja, 720 F.3d at 989 (declining to 
extend Slaughter to § 1983 claims).  Even if line 
drawing is appropriate, this Court should provide 
guidance on which statutes should allow immediate 
appeal and which statutes fall outside the collateral 
appeal doctrine so that the circuits are unified in 
application.   
This Court has previously recognized the 
confusion among and within circuits in previous 
petitions for certiorari during the 1980s that were all 
subsequently denied.  Justice White, joined by Justice 
Blackmun, explained that the continued confusion 
demonstrated by the Second and Ninth Circuits 
“warrant[ed the Court’s] granting certiorari” in his 
dissent in Welch, 484 U.S. 903 (1987).   
The circuit split in the 1980s has only become 
more entrenched as every circuit has now decided 
whether the collateral appeal doctrine allows for 
immediate appeal of the denial of appointment of 
counsel orders.  Without further guidance from this 
Court on a “plainly recurring question,” the district 
and circuit courts will continue to hold differently on 
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whether immediate appeal is appropriate.  See Henry 
474 U.S. 1036 (1985) (White and Blackmun, J., 
dissenting).  Allowing courts to interpret the collateral 
appeal doctrine differently results in immediate relief 
for some indigent litigants and likely devastation for 
others.   
B. Allowing immediate appeal of denial of 
appointment of counsel orders will provide 
greater access to the courts and promote 
judicial economy. 
Granting certiorari over this conflict will finally 
determine whether indigent litigants have the ability 
to immediately appeal the denial of appointed counsel 
orders, thus providing greater access to the courts.  If 
indigent plaintiffs have to wait until a final order has 
been determined, many will be forced to drop legiti-
mate claims, and others will struggle through the 
legal process but fail to preserve issues for appeal.  By 
denying jurisdiction over the denial of appointment of 
counsel orders, courts are not only inhibiting access to 
counsel to those who need it most, but are also 
creating incoherent records to be sorted through later 
on appeal.   
For the appointment of counsel to have any 
“practical effect,” counsel must be appointed at the 
start of the case.  See Ray, 640 F.2d at 477.  Counsel 
benefits the judicial process by effectively developing 
the record and introducing legal arguments to 
preserve for appeal on a level that a layperson—but 
especially an indigent plaintiff—would simply not be 
able to match.  Pro se litigants do not generally have 
the skills or resources to develop the record in a way 
to help preserve appealable issues.   
 
 
 
 
18
If indigent plaintiffs are forced to wait until a final 
decision to appeal the denial of appointment of 
counsel, the record below will undoubtedly come to the 
appellate judge in disarray.  If a pro se litigant does 
successfully bring his case to the appellate court, the 
judge will have to spend time parsing through an 
incoherent record to determine any merit to the claim 
and the necessity of counsel.  See Bradshaw, 662 F.2d 
at 1315 (stating that a pro se appeal provides a 
“guarantee that the resources of the court and the 
parties would be senselessly dissipated in the 
process”).  Without the assistance of counsel from the 
beginning, the plaintiff “would be bound by the 
inevitable prejudicial errors she would make at her 
first trial.”  Id. at 1311-12.   
Even if an appellate judge grants a new trial with 
appointed counsel, the case essentially has to begin 
again, causing a greater strain on judicial time and 
resources than an immediate collateral appeal.  
Judicial economy will be better served if the appellate 
court can determine whether a plaintiff requires 
counsel to navigate complex legal matters as a 
collateral issue at the outset of the trial.  It does not 
serve the judiciary’s best interests to allow an 
indigent plaintiff to develop a record in a case 
involving complex legal issues, likely committing 
prejudicial errors in the process that are difficult or 
impossible to cure on appeal.  By waiting for a final 
decision, “the effectiveness of appellate review will be 
seriously impaired by the very nature of the order” 
because of the state of the record.”  Bradshaw, 662 
F.2d at 1315.   
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Laypersons do not have the same access to 
resources or the knowledge to adequately represent 
themselves in court when dealing with complicated 
legal issues.  See Caston, 556 F.2d at 1308 (stating 
that a layperson “has little hope of successfully 
prosecuting his case to a final resolution on the 
merits”).  Justice and efficiency are better served by 
providing counsel immediately to indigent plaintiffs 
faced with such complex legal matters.   
The purpose behind the in forma pauperis statute, 
moreover, was to provide effective counsel to plaintiffs 
when they could not otherwise afford it.  Denying an 
appeal of such counsel until a final decision on the 
merits cuts contrary to this principle.  Many litigants 
are forced to abandon their cases before trial 
commences if not provided counsel to assist in 
navigating a complex legal field.  Others may try to 
continue through trial but fail to preserve issues for 
appeal.  Both of these outcomes make reviewing the 
denial of appointment of counsel orders only after a 
final decision insufficient to address the needs of 
indigent plaintiffs.   
The appointment of counsel is generally outcome 
determinative for indigent plaintiffs.  And thus, the 
denial of appointment of counsel is the single, most 
important judicial order of the entire litigation.  But 
since the order predates any record development and 
any legal theories, it falls completely outside the 
merits of the case and should be recognized as 
collaterally appealable.   
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be 
granted, the judgment below should be reversed, and 
the case should be remanded for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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APPENDIX A 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
 
No. 16-5004   September Term, 2015 
    1:14-cv-00403-RDM 
 
   Filed On: June 6, 2016 
 
SAI, 
Appellant, 
v. 
 
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION, (TSA), 
 Appellee. 
 
Before: Kavanaugh and Wilkins, Circuit Judges; 
Ginsburg, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
O R D E R 
 
Upon consideration of the order to show cause 
filed January 19, 2016, and the appellant’s petition for 
an initial hearing en banc, which the court denied by 
order filed March 11, 2016; and the lack of any further 
response to the order to show cause, it is 
ORDERED that the order to show cause be 
discharged.  It is 
FURTHER ORDERED that this appeal be 
dismissed.  This court lacks jurisdiction to review on 
an interlocutory basis the district court’s denial of 
appellant’s motion for appointment of counsel.  See 
Ficken v. Alvarez, 146 F.3d 978, 980-83 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 
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Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)). 
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this 
disposition will not be published.  The Clerk is 
directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein 
until seven days after resolution of any timely 
petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc.  See Fed. 
R. App. P. 41(b); 
D.C. Cir. Rule 41. 
Per Curiam 
FOR THE COURT: 
Mark J. Langer, Clerk 
 
By: /s/ 
Robert J. Cavello 
Deputy Clerk 
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APPENDIX B 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
 
No. 16-5004   September Term, 2015 
    1:14-cv-00403-RDM 
 
   Filed On: March 11, 2016 
 
SAI, 
Appellant, 
v. 
 
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION, (TSA), 
 Appellee. 
 
Before: Garland, Chief Judge; Henderson, Rogers, 
Tatel, Brown, Griffith, Kavanaugh, Srinivasan, 
Millett, Pillard, and Wilkins, Circuit Judges. 
 
O R D E R 
 
Upon consideration of appellant’s petition for 
initial hearing en banc, and the absence of a request 
by any member of the court for a vote, it is 
 
ORDERED that the petition be denied 
 
Per Curiam 
FOR THE COURT: 
Mark J. Langer, Clerk 
By: /s/ 
Ken R. Meadows 
Deputy Clerk 
   
 4a
APPENDIX C 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
 
   Civil Action No. 14-403 (RDM) 
 
SAI, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION, 
 Defendant. 
 
MINUTE ORDER: It is hereby ORDERED that 
the parties shall file a joint status report on or before 
March 4, 2016. It is further ORDERED that the 
parties shall appear for a status conference on March 
11, 2016, at 10 a.m. in Courtroom 21. Any party who 
wishes to appear telephonically shall contact the 
Courtroom Deputy Clerk to arrange for telephonic 
participation. During the status conference held 
today, January 7, 2016, Plaintiff Sai made an oral 
motion to reconsider the Court's March 13, 2014 fiat 
order denying without prejudice his Motion for Leave 
to Proceed in forma pauperis and for Appointment of 
Counsel. The oral motion was based on the reasons 
stated in Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in 
forma pauperis and to Appoint Counsel in Case No. 
14-1876 (Dkts. 65 & 66). The Court orally denied the 
motion for the same reasons as stated in that case. See 
No. 14-1876, Dkt. 88. Signed by Judge Randolph D. 
Moss on 1/7/2016. (lcrdm1, ) (Entered: 01/07/2016) 
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APPENDIX D 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
 
   Civil Action No. 14-1876 (RDM) 
 
SAI, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, et al., 
 Defendants. 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
Plaintiff, who suffers from a neurological disorder 
that causes intermittent muteness and muscle 
spasms, alleges that he was harassed and mistreated 
on the basis of his disability during two incidents at 
airport security checkpoints in early 2013—one at 
Boston Logan International Airport (“BOS”) and the 
other at San Francisco International Airport (“SFO”). 
He filed administrative complaints with the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) under 
procedures promulgated pursuant to the 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. When DHS 
failed to respond to his complaints, he brought this 
suit, alleging causes of action under the 
Rehabilitation Act and the Administrative Procedure 
Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.  Notably, the 
present suit does not directly seek redress for 
Plaintiff’s alleged mistreatment at the security 
checkpoints. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that DHS, the 
Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”), and 
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the individuals who were responsible for processing 
his administrative complaints violated his rights by 
failing to respond to his those complaints within the 
time period prescribed by the governing regulation.  
To the extent the Rehabilitation Act provides a 
remedy relating to any discrimination that Plaintiff 
may have suffered at the two checkpoints, he has 
elected to pursue those claims in other litigation. See, 
e.g., Sai v. TSA, No. 15-cv-13308 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 
2015). 
The case is before the Court on three dispositive 
motions: (1) a motion to dismiss filed by DHS, the TSA 
and several individual defendants sued in their 
official capacities, Dkt. 23; (2) a separate motion to 
dismiss filed by the individual defendants, who were 
also sued in their personal capacities, Dkt. 63; and (3) 
Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment, Dkt. 
7. Plaintiff has also filed three non-dispositive 
motions: (4) a motion for leave to take discovery, Dkt. 
72 at 38; (5) a motion for leave to amend his complaint, 
Dkt. 73; and (6) a renewed motion for leave to proceed 
in forma pauperis, Dkts. 65, 66. This Memorandum 
Opinion and the Order that accompanies it resolve 
these six motions before the Court.  
With respect to Plaintiff’s claims against DHS, the 
TSA, and the individual defendants sued in their 
official capacities (“Agency Defendants”), the Court 
will grant in part and deny in part the Agency 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and will grant in part 
and deny in part Plaintiff’s motion for partial 
summary judgment. First, to the extent Plaintiff 
seeks to compel the Agency Defendants to respond to 
his BOS complaint, his claim is moot, because DHS 
responded to the BOS complaint after he filed this 
action. Second, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages 
as a result of the Agency Defendants’ failure to 
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process his complaints, neither the Rehabilitation Act 
nor the APA affords him such a remedy. Finally, to 
the extent that Plaintiff seeks to compel the Agency 
Defendants to respond to his SFO complaint on the 
theory that they have unlawfully delayed such a 
response, the Court agrees that such relief is 
available. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s 
underlying cause of action against these defendants 
arises under the APA, not the Rehabilitation Act, 
there is no evidence that Congress intended to 
preclude relief under Section 706(1) of the APA, which 
instructs courts to “compel agency action unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 
Further, because it is uncontroverted that the Agency 
Defendants have failed to respond to Plaintiff’s SFO 
complaint for almost three years, and because 
Defendants have failed to justify the delay, the Court 
agrees with Plaintiff that relief under Section 706(1) 
is not only available but appropriate. Accordingly, the 
Agency Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED 
with respect to Plaintiff’s claims for monetary and 
nonmonetary relief arising out of the BOS complaint 
and for monetary relief arising out of the SFO 
complaint and DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s 
claim for nonmonetary relief arising out of his SFO 
complaint. Correspondingly, Plaintiff’s motion for 
partial summary judgment is GRANTED with respect 
to his claim for nonmonetary relief arising out of his 
SFO complaint and DENIED with respect to his BOS 
complaint.  
With respect to Plaintiff’s claims against the 
individual defendants sued in their personal 
capacities (“Individual Defendants”), the Court 
concludes that the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679, 
requires the substitution of the United States for 
Individual Defendants for every claim except the 
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claim asserted under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and that, because 
Plaintiff concededly failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies before filing suit, these 
claims must then be dismissed. The Court also 
concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim 
under Bivens or any similar cause of action against 
the individual-capacity defendants. Accordingly, 
Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss is 
GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims against them are 
dismissed.  
Finally, for the reasons stated below, the Court 
DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for additional discovery 
(Dkt. 72 at 38), DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for leave to 
amend his complaint (Dkt. 73), and DENIES 
Plaintiff’s renewed motion for leave to proceed in 
forma pauperis or, in the alternative, to file an 
application ex parte and under seal (Dkt. 65). 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
Plaintiff, whose full legal name is Sai, has a 
“permanent, episodic motor disability” that can cause 
painful muscle spasms, speech impairment, and even 
paralysis.  Dkt. 1 at 47.  Episodes of high stress can 
trigger or exacerbate these symptoms. Id. As a result, 
Plaintiff has on multiple occasions experienced acute 
symptoms while going through airport security 
checkpoints.  This action arises out of two such 
incidents: one at Boston Logan International Airport 
on January 21, 2013, and another at San Francisco 
International Airport on March 1, 2013.  Id. at 37.  
During each incident, Plaintiff alleges that TSA 
agents failed to accommodate his disability by 
denying him access to medication and writing 
implements for use when he was unable to speak, 
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among other things. See id.; see also Dkt. 31-1 at 1–3. 
In response to these incidents, Plaintiff filed two 
administrative complaints with DHS— the first on 
January 26, 2013, and the second on March 15, 2013. 
Dkt. 1 at 30–31.  In the complaints, he alleged that 
the agency had violated the Rehabilitation Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 794, by discriminating against him on the 
basis of his disability. Id.  DHS acknowledged that it 
had received Plaintiff’s complaints, id., but did not 
respond to the substance of the complaints within the 
180-day period specified in the DHS regulations. 
Plaintiff made repeated efforts to obtain a response to 
his complaints, see id. at 33–43, but to no avail. As of 
November 5, 2014, when he filed this lawsuit, Plaintiff 
had received no substantive response from DHS to 
either complaint. Id. at 1, 43.  Although Plaintiff 
eventually received a response to his BOS complaint 
(on March 4, 2015, over two years after it was filed), 
see Dkt. 31 at 1, he has received no response to his 
SFO complaint. 
Attempting to remedy what he views as unlawful 
delay, Plaintiff filed this suit against a variety of 
defendants—including DHS, the TSA, and ten named 
individual defendants ranging from the 
Administrator of the TSA to the individual DHS 
officers who handled his complaints, in both their 
official and their personal capacities. Dkt. 1 at 5–6. 
Construing the pro se complaint liberally, as the 
Court is required to do, Plaintiff alleged causes of 
action under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; 
the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706; Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388; the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346; and a number of 
common-law torts, including negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional 
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distress, and conspiracy.1 Id. at 9–14. Plaintiff seeks 
declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order 
compelling DHS to produce responses to his 
administrative complaints, and money damages, as 
well as costs. Id. at 14–15.  
The present action does not seek relief for the 
allegedly discriminatory acts at the security 
checkpoints. Instead, Plaintiff maintains that “[t]his 
suit is brought strictly for matters relating to 
defendants’ handling of [his] complaints.” Id. at 5. 
Plaintiff has brought another suit, in the District of 
Massachusetts, to challenge the TSA’s actions at the 
BOS checkpoint. See Sai v. TSA, No. 15-cv-13308 (D. 
Mass. Sept. 4, 2015).2 The present action, in contrast, 
is premised on a regulation that requires DHS to 
respond to an administrative complaint brought 
under the Rehabilitation Act within 180 days. See 6 
C.F.R. § 15.70(g)(1). Defendants do not dispute that 
                                            
1 Defendants dispute whether Plaintiff’s complaint properly 
pleads a claim under the APA. See Dkt. 23 at 12–13; Dkt. 62 at 
3–4. But Count 1 of Plaintiff’s complaint explicitly states that “5 
[U.S.C.] § 706(1) requires that defendants be compelled [to] issue 
the two responses unlawfully withheld and unreasonably 
delayed.” Dkt. 1 at 10 (emphasis in original). Especially 
considered in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the complaint’s 
pleadings are sufficient to state an APA claim. 
2 The Massachusetts action also repeats many of the allegations 
raised here relating to the handling of Plaintiff’s administrative 
complaints. See Complaint at 7, Sai, No. 15-cv-13308 (D. Mass. 
Sept. 4, 2015) (describing the TSA’s “deliberate[] and unlawful[] 
refus[al] to respond to Sai’s grievance”). In addition, Plaintiff has 
filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy 
Act in this district seeking the disclosure of material relating to 
the incidents and to the handling of the administrative 
complaints. See Sai v. TSA, No. 14-cv-703 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2014). 
The merits of that action are not before the Court in this Opinion 
or in the accompanying Order 
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DHS failed to act on Plaintiff’s complaints within the 
180-day period. They dispute only the legal 
consequences of their inaction. 
B. Procedural History  
The Court has previously outlined the extensive 
procedural history of this case and will only repeat the 
portions of that history relevant to the pending 
motions. See Sai v. DHS, 99 F. Supp. 3d 50 (D.D.C. 
2015). In particular, Plaintiff moved for partial 
summary judgment almost immediately after filing 
the action. See Dkt. 7. Amid a flurry of more than a 
dozen procedural motions filed by Plaintiff, 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12. 
See Dkt. 23. On April 16, 2015, the Court entered an 
order resolving the pending procedural motions, 
setting a schedule for the resolution of the dispositive 
cross-motions, and imposing rules governing 
subsequent motions practice. Sai, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 
56–69. Both Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 
judgment and Defendants’ motions to dismiss are now 
fully briefed.  
In the meantime, on March 4, 2015, DHS 
responded to Plaintiff’s first administrative 
complaint, which concerned his treatment at Boston 
Logan International Airport. See Dkt. 31. In its 
response, the TSA denied that any violation of the 
Rehabilitation Act had occurred. See id. at 8. In the 
TSA’s view, the actions that TSA agents took at the 
airport were based not on Plaintiff’s disability but on 
his “continued failure to cooperate with the screening 
process.” Id. Further, the TSA reasoned, nothing the 
TSA agents did at the airport deprived Plaintiff of 
“full and complete access to TSA’s security screening 
program.” Id. at 9 (quoting Ruskai v. Pistole, 775 F.3d 
61, 79 (1st Cir. 2014)). Finally, the TSA explained, 
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Plaintiff’s failure fully to inform TSA agents about his 
disability limited “the government’s ability to offer a 
reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff 
appealed the TSA’s decision within the agency, but his 
appeal was denied on August 25, 2015. See Dkt. 78-1 
at 1. He filed suit to challenge that decision in the 
District of Massachusetts on September 4, 2015. See 
Sai v. TSA, No. 15-cv-13308 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2015). 
II. DISCUSSION  
A. Threshold Issues  
1. Mootness  
As an initial matter, the Court must consider how 
DHS’s denial of Plaintiff’s complaint arising out of the 
BOS incident affects the scope of the case and the 
Court’s jurisdiction. As the Court of Appeals has 
observed, “subject matter jurisdiction ‘is, of necessity, 
the first issue for an Article III court,’ for ‘[t]he federal 
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and they lack 
the power to presume the existence of jurisdiction in 
order to dispose of any case on any other grounds.’” 
Loughlin v. United States, 393 F.3d 155, 170 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (quoting Tuck v. Pan Am. Health Org., 668 
F.2d 547, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). This principle, 
moreover, extends to each distinct claim asserted in a 
case—absent subject-matter jurisdiction, federal 
courts are without power to consider or to adjudicate 
any claim, see Loughlin, 393 F.3d at 171—and the 
principle cannot be lessened or avoided by combining 
multiple claims in a single count.  
A federal court’s duty to ensure that it is acting 
within the confines of its jurisdiction continues 
throughout the course of the litigation. The parties 
must maintain a live dispute, with concrete 
consequences, “at all stages of review, not merely at 
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the time the complaint is filed.” Steffel v. Thompson, 
415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974). Thus, where “events 
have so transpired that the decision will neither 
presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a more-
than-speculative chance of affecting them in the 
future,” the relevant case or claim becomes moot, 
Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 897 F.2d 570, 575 
(D.C. Cir. 1990), and, absent unusual circumstances, 
the Court is deprived of jurisdiction. See also 
Loughlin, 393 F.3d at 170 (“[M]ootness doctrine 
encompasses the circumstances that destroy the 
justiciability of a suit previously suitable for 
determination.’” (quoting 13A Charles A. Wright et 
al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3533 (2d ed. 
1984))).  
Here, there is no dispute that the Court had Article 
III jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims at the time he 
filed them. But it is equally clear that “events have 
transpired” that have limited the scope of the live 
controversy between the parties. As relevant here, 
Plaintiff filed the instant suit to compel DHS and 
other defendants to respond to the two administrative 
complaints that Plaintiff filed. Since then, DHS has 
rendered its final decision with respect to the BOS 
complaint. As a result, at least with respect to that 
aspect of the dispute, there is nothing left for the 
Court to do, and that portion of the case is therefore 
moot.  
Despite having received a response to his BOS 
complaint, Plaintiff contends that the Court still has 
jurisdiction to consider the merits of his claim for 
injunctive and declaratory relief because the alleged 
misconduct is “capable of repetition, yet evading 
review.” See Dkt. 80 at 7. Plaintiff is correct that the 
courts recognize an exception to the mootness doctrine 
for claims that “evad[e] review” because “the 
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challenged action was in its duration too short to be 
fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration,” and 
that are “capable of repetition” because there is “a 
reasonable expectation that the same complaining 
party would be subject to the same action again.” 
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (quoting 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per 
curiam)); see also United Bhd. of Carpenters & 
Joiners of Am., AFL-CIO v. Operative Plasterers’ & 
Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n of U.S. & Canada, AFL-
CIO, 721 F.3d 678, 687–88 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Plaintiff 
is incorrect, however, that the exception applies here. 
Whether defendants acted unlawfully in failing timely 
to respond to Plaintiff’s BOS complaint is not an issue 
that “evades review”: indeed, Plaintiff has raised the 
same legal issue with respect to his SFO complaint, 
which the Court’s Opinion resolves. And because DHS 
has yet to act on that administrative complaint, 
making it ripe for adjudication here, Plaintiff has no 
basis to invoke the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-
review exception to the mootness doctrine with 
respect to the BOS complaint.  
Plaintiff also contends that he has not received the 
type of response to the BOS complaint to which he is 
entitled. Pointing to his motion to expedite, Plaintiff 
argues that what he has sought are responses to the 
administrative complaints “without litigation-
induced omissions.” Dkt. 70 at 21 (quoting Dkt. 7 at 
3). That, however, is a different claim from the one 
asserted in the complaint, and at any rate it is facially 
untenable. It is one thing to seek to compel an agency 
to respond to an administrative complaint within a 
reasonable time. It is entirely another to seek to 
control what that response says. Under Section 706(1) 
of the APA, a court may at times compel an agency “to 
take a discrete agency action that is it is required to 
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take,” but may not direct “how it shall act.” Norton v. 
S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004) 
(emphases in original). Because Plaintiff did not seek 
this relief in the complaint—and because any effort to 
amend the complaint to include such a claim would be 
futile—this argument cannot salvage Plaintiff’s claim 
for injunctive and declaratory relief stemming from 
the BOS events.  
Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory 
relief relating to the BOS complaint are, accordingly, 
DISMISSED as moot. To the extent Plaintiff seeks 
damages or other relief with respect to the handling 
of the BOS complaint, those issues are separately 
addressed below. 
2. Summary Judgment and Rule 56(d)  
Plaintiff argues, as a preliminary matter, that the 
defendants’ motions to dismiss should be treated as 
motions for summary judgment and that the Court 
should then defer or deny the motions in order to 
permit Plaintiff an opportunity to obtain discovery 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). 
Dkt. 72 at 7, 38; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), 56(d). The 
Court disagrees. Rule 12(d) requires a court to treat a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a motion for 
summary judgment if it relies on “matters outside the 
pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). But Plaintiff points 
to only two documents that he believes satisfy this 
standard. He first notes that DHS relies on its 
response to his BOS administrative complaint to 
argue that the case is moot. But that document was 
the subject of Plaintiff’s own motion to take judicial 
notice, see Dkt. 31, which the Court now GRANTS, 
and, in any event, neither the fact that DHS has now 
responded nor the substance of that response is in any 
way disputed. Cf. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 
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Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (describing 
“documents incorporated into the complaint by 
reference” and “matters of which a court may take 
judicial notice” as “sources courts ordinarily examine 
when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions”). The 
undisputed existence of a DHS response to the BOS 
complaint does not turn the mootness inquiry into one 
in which additional evidence is necessary, nor does 
Plaintiff identify any evidence he believes he might 
obtain in discovery that would be relevant to the 
inquiry.  
The only other “factual” material Plaintiff 
identifies is Defendants’ Westfall certification, see 
Dkt. 23-1, but the Westfall Act contemplates the 
introduction of such a certification at the motion-to-
dismiss stage, see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d), and the Court 
knows of no authority for the proposition that its 
introduction converts a motion to dismiss into a 
motion for summary judgment. Moreover, as 
discussed below, to the extent that Plaintiff 
challenges the government’s Westfall certification, 
Plaintiff has not identified any disputed question of 
fact with sufficient specificity to open the door even to 
“limited discovery” regarding the absolute immunity 
afforded government employees acting within the 
scope of their employment. See Wuterich v. Murtha, 
562 F.3d 375, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s 
conclusory assertion that he “cannot present facts 
essential to justify [his] opposition” because they are 
“unavailable” to him, Dkt. 72 at 38 (quoting Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(d)), does not satisfy this standard. As the 
Court of Appeals has cautioned, opening the door to 
discovery based on “intuition” or the hope of finding 
some basis to challenge a Westfall certification 
“simply has no place in a Westfall Act absolute 
immunity case.” Wuterich, 562 F.3d at 386.  
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The Court, therefore, DENIES Plaintiff’s request 
to convert Defendants’ motions to dismiss into 
motions for summary judgment, Dkt. 72 at 7, and 
DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for discovery under Rule 
56(d), id. at 38–39.  
B. Count I  
Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the 
Agency Defendants violated Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act and the APA by failing to respond 
to Plaintiff’s administrative complaints in a timely 
manner. As a preliminary matter, the Court observes 
that Plaintiff cannot plausibly claim relief under 
Count I other than nonmonetary relief relating to the 
Agency Defendants’ delay in processing the SFO 
complaint. The Rehabilitation Act does not waive the 
sovereign immunity of the United States for monetary 
claims arising from alleged discrimination “under any 
program or activity conducted by any Executive 
agency,” see Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 191, 197 
(1996), nor does the APA waive sovereign immunity 
for claims seeking monetary relief, see 5 U.S.C. § 702 
(authorizing “[a]n action in a court of the United 
States seeking relief other than money damages”). 
And, for the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s 
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief relating to 
his BOS administrative complaint are moot.  
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks injunctive or 
declaratory relief requiring DHS to provide a response 
to his SFO complaint, however, he is on stronger 
ground. Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on Count 
I based on two straightforward propositions: (1) DHS’s 
Rehabilitation Act regulations require the agency to 
respond to an administrative complaint within 180 
days, 6 C.F.R. § 15.70(g)(1); and (2) almost three years 
have passed since Plaintiff filed the SFO complaint 
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with DHS. Defendants do not dispute either premise, 
but they maintain that neither the Rehabilitation Act 
nor the APA provides an applicable cause of action. In 
their view, the Rehabilitation Act “implies a private 
right of action to sue for injunctive relief in federal 
court” for violations of the substantive rights 
protected by Section 504, but the Act does not create 
a private right of action for violations of the 
administrative rules at issue here. Dkt. 60 at 4–5. 
They further argue that the APA does not fill this gap, 
since catch-all review is available under the APA only 
“for final agency action [including a ‘failure to act’] for 
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 704. According to Defendants, 
the availability of a cause of action under the 
Rehabilitation Act for violations of the substantive 
rights established by Section 504 constitutes an 
alternative “adequate remedy in a court” and thus 
precludes APA review of any shortcomings in the 
administrative process. Dkt. 23 at 10–12.  
As explained below, the Court agrees that Plaintiff 
does not have a cause of action under the 
Rehabilitation Act for the agency’s failure to respond 
to the SFO complaint in a timely manner. Defendants 
are also correct that, at times, the existence of an 
alternative remedy for a substantive right precludes 
APA review of an agency’s asserted failure to resolve 
an administrative complaint in a timely fashion. 
Thus, for example, in Council of and for the Blind of 
Delaware County Valley v. Regan, 709 F.2d 1521, 
1531–32 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (en banc), the Court of 
Appeals held that the availability of an alternative 
substantive remedy set out in an independent statute 
precluded APA review of the agency’s failure to meet 
a statutory deadline for administrative resolution of a 
discrimination claim. The Court disagrees, however, 
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that this is such a case.  
Defendants’ preclusion argument turns on the 
premise that Plaintiff has a cause of action under the 
Rehabilitation Act, and that this cause of action is an 
adequate alternative remedy that precludes APA 
review. As explained below, however, that premise is 
incorrect. Any claim that Plaintiff may have to enforce 
Section 504 does not arise implicitly under the 
Rehabilitation Act; it arises under the APA itself. As 
a result, unlike in Council of and for the Blind, there 
is no basis to conclude that Congress has provided 
Plaintiff with an independent statutory remedy that 
would preclude APA review of Plaintiff’s related 
administrative claim. Because DHS has manifestly 
failed to comply with its obligation to render a decision 
on the SFO complaint in a timely manner, and has 
offered no justification for its delay, the Court agrees 
that Plaintiff is entitled to relief for “agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 
U.S.C. § 706(1). 
1. Source of Plaintiff’s Cause of Action  
Because Defendants’ arguments turn on the 
remedies afforded Plaintiff by the Rehabilitation Act 
and the APA, the Court begins by identifying the 
source of Plaintiff’s cause of action to enforce the 
Rehabilitation Act. Congress enacted the 
Rehabilitation Act, the “first major federal statute 
designed to protect the rights of and provide 
assistance to the handicapped people of this country,” 
Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1990), 
“to ensure that members of the disabled community 
could live independently and fully participate in 
society,” American Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 
525 F.3d 1256, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Under Section 
504 of the Act, 
 20a
[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability in the United States . . . shall, solely 
by reason of her or his disability, be excluded 
from the participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance or under any program or activity 
conducted by any Executive agency . . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Section 504 further provides that 
“[t]he head of each [Executive] agency shall 
promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to 
carry out” the 1978 amendments to the Act, which 
extended its protections to “program[s] or activit[ies]” 
conducted by federal agencies. Id. 
Section 504 unambiguously imposes a duty on 
federal agencies not to discriminate on the basis of 
disability in “any program or activity” they conduct. It 
is this duty that Plaintiff initially sought to enforce—
first by filing an administrative complaint with the 
agency, and then by filing suit in Massachusetts to 
challenge the agency’s response to that complaint. But 
Section 504 also requires federal agencies to adopt 
implementing regulations to “carry out” their 
obligations under the Act. Count I of the complaint in 
this lawsuit implicates this duty; it asserts that the 
Agency Defendants have violated the Rehabilitation 
Act by failing to comply with the regulations they 
have promulgated to enforce it. The Agency 
Defendants, as noted above, do not contest that they 
have failed to comply with the governing regulations. 
They simply argue that Plaintiff lacks a cause of 
action to enforce those regulations, because (1) the 
Rehabilitation Act does not permit a suit to challenge 
an agency’s delay in responding to an administrative 
complaint brought under procedures promulgated 
pursuant to the Act, and (2) Plaintiff cannot resort to 
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Section 706(1) of the APA, because the existence of a 
substantive Rehabilitation Act cause of action 
precludes APA review, including review of an alleged 
administrative failing. 
a. Rehabilitation Act  
The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff 
does not have a cause of action under the 
Rehabilitation Act to remedy DHS’s failure to respond 
to the SFO complaint in a timely manner. The 
Rehabilitation Act says nothing about the processing 
or consideration of administrative complaints. 
Rather, it merely requires that federal agencies 
“promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to 
carry out” the 1978 amendments to the Act. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 794(a). There is no question that DHS has adopted 
those regulations, see 6 C.F.R. § 15.70, and Plaintiff 
does not seek to compel the adoption or modification 
of the statutorily-required regulation. Likewise, the 
remedial provision of the Rehabilitation Act says 
nothing about claims to enforce the Act’s 
implementing regulations. As discussed in greater 
detail below, in relevant respects, that section of the 
Act merely authorizes claims relating to 
discrimination by recipients or providers of federal 
assistance. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a).  
Nor is there any basis to imply a cause of action 
under the Rehabilitation Act for an agency’s failure to 
comply with its implementing regulations. As the 
Supreme Court has admonished, “private rights of 
action to enforce federal law must be created by 
Congress.” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 
(2001). As a result, “[t]he judicial task is to interpret 
the statute Congress has passed to determine whether 
it displays an intent to create not just a private right 
but also a private remedy.” Id. Section 504 requires 
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agencies to adopt procedures to implement Congress’s 
antidiscrimination mandate, but it lacks the “‘rights-
creating’ language” that the Supreme Court 
demanded in Sandoval. See id. at 288; see also 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 
(1979). To the contrary, the part of Section 504 that 
requires agencies to adopt these regulations operates 
much like the statutory text found insufficient in 
Sandoval: its focus is not “on the individuals 
protected” but on the federal agencies that it instructs 
to implement the substantive provisions of the Act. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289. The fact that those 
implementing regulations require that DHS respond 
to complaints within 180 days, moreover, does not 
create a cause of action where Congress has failed to 
do so. As Sandoval also explains, “[l]anguage in a 
regulation may invoke a private right of action that 
Congress through statutory text created, but it may 
not create a right that Congress has not.” Id. at 291.  
b. Administrative Procedure Act  
As a result, the question comes down to whether 
the APA creates a cause of action for Defendants’ 
alleged failure to respond to the SFO complaint in a 
timely manner. Defendants argue that the APA is 
unavailable to remedy any shortcomings in DHS’s 
administrative process because the Rehabilitation Act 
provides an adequate alternative remedy in the form 
of an implied cause of action to vindicate substantive 
rights under Section 504. That contention, in turn, 
requires that the Court consider the statutory basis 
for whatever cause of action Plaintiff may have to 
assert those substantive rights.  
Although the law is unsettled regarding the exact 
source of the cause of action, no court has questioned 
that claims for nonmonetary relief seeking to enforce 
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Section 504’s ban on discrimination in federal 
programs are actionable. In Lane v. Peña, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress, in amending the 
Rehabilitation Act to cover federal programs and 
activities, did not intend to waive the United States’s 
sovereign immunity for suits for money damages. See 
518 U.S. at 189, 200. The United States did not 
contest the availability of injunctive relief, however, 
id. at 196, and the Supreme Court was careful to limit 
its discussion and holding to “awards of monetary 
damages,” id. at 189, 192–93, 196, 200. Subsequently, 
in American Council of the Blind v. Paulson, an 
advocacy group and several blind individuals sued the 
Department of Transportation for failing to design 
and issue forms of paper currency that would be 
recognizable to the blind. See Am. Council of the Blind 
v. Paulson, 463 F. Supp. 2d 51, 52 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d, 
525 F.3d 1256. Before the district court, the United 
States argued that Lane foreclosed the availability of 
nonmonetary relief against federal agencies that had 
violated Section 504. See 463 F. Supp. 2d at 57–58. 
The district court rejected that argument, concluding 
that Lane had done no more than foreclose a suit for 
damages against a federal agency, id. at 58, and the 
government abandoned the argument on appeal, see 
525 F.3d at 1266. Although the Court of Appeals did 
not discuss the source of the relevant cause of action, 
it affirmed the district court’s interlocutory decision 
granting a declaratory judgment against the Treasury 
Department for failing “to design and issue paper 
currency that is readily distinguishable to the visually 
impaired,” id. at 1259, and remanded the case to the 
district court “to address the Council’s request for 
injunctive relief,” id. at 1274.  
This, however, leaves the question whether the 
cause of action for a substantive claim of disability 
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discrimination in a federal program or activity arises 
under the Rehabilitation Act itself or under the APA. 
This question was not addressed in Lane, because, as 
the Solicitor General noted in his brief, “resolution of 
the source of the cause of action, be it under Section 
504(a) directly or the APA, would . . . not alter the 
outcome of this case” as long as Section 504(a) was not 
read to waive sovereign immunity for monetary 
damages. See Brief for the Respondents, Lane, 518 
U.S. 187 (No. 95-365), 1996 WL 115795, at *27 n.17. 
For the following reasons, the Court concludes that 
the cause of action arises under the APA. First, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned courts not to 
imply causes of action in the absence of evidence that 
Congress intended “to create not just a private right 
but also a private remedy.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286. 
Here, Congress unambiguously intended to create a 
right to be free from disability discrimination in 
federal programs and activities. See 29 U.S.C. § 
794(a). But there is relatively little evidence that 
Congress intended to create a private cause of action 
under the Rehabilitation Act to enforce that right. As 
the Supreme Court observed in Lane, the Act 
expressly specifies the remedies available to “any 
person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any 
recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of 
such assistance,” id. § 794a(a)(2), but it says nothing 
about the remedies available to a person aggrieved by 
discrimination in a “program or activity conducted by 
an[] Executive agency,” id. § 794(a); see Lane, 518 U.S. 
at 192.  
Second, it is easy to imagine why Congress would 
not have created a private cause of action to enforce 
Section 504 against federal agencies: it knew that 
review would be available under the APA. The APA 
“embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to 
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one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency action.’” 
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) 
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). As then-Judge Breyer wrote 
almost three decades ago, “federal action is nearly 
always reviewable for conformity with statutory 
obligations without any such ‘private right of action.’” 
NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 
152 (1st Cir. 1987). Although Congress might provide 
for a cause of action against an agency (as well as a 
waiver of sovereign immunity) when it intends to 
permit an aggrieved person to recover damages from 
the United States, when it intends to permit only 
declaratory and injunctive relief, there will often be no 
need to provide for a cause of action that is 
independent of the APA. Cf. J.L. v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 
971 F.2d 260, 268 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Whether this suit 
is characterized as review of agency action under the 
APA or a private suit directly under the 
Rehabilitation Act should not make a significant 
difference to [plaintiffs’] chances for success on the 
merits.” (internal quotation marks omitted))), 
overruled on other grounds by Lane, 518 U.S. 187. 
Finally, although the caselaw on this question 
from other circuits is sparse, it supports the 
conclusion that Plaintiff’s cause of action arises under 
the APA. The most thorough treatment of the issue 
can be found in the First Circuit’s decision in Cousins 
v. Secretary of the Department of Transportation, 880 
F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc). In that case, the 
plaintiff, a hearing-impaired truck driver, claimed 
that a Department of Transportation regulation 
prevented him from working in violation of his rights 
under the Rehabilitation Act. Although a panel of the 
court initially held that the plaintiff properly brought 
his action as an implied claim under the 
Rehabilitation Act, the en banc court disagreed and 
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held that the claim should have been brought under 
the APA. Id. at 605–08. The First Circuit explained 
that, although the Rehabilitation Act expressly 
provides a cause of action against the government in 
its role as provider of federal funds, “the Act is silent 
about whether and how a person injured by the 
government as regulator is to enforce the Act against 
the government.” Id. at 605 (emphasis in original). In 
that court’s view, this “omission simply reflects the 
fact that such a person already has a right to judicial 
review, as set forth in the APA.” Id. This conclusion, 
the court explained, furthers the purposes of the APA 
to provide a “single uniform method for review of 
agency action,” id., and it avoids the oddity of implying 
a cause of action where another statute already 
provides a means for the plaintiff “to challenge [the] 
agency action,” id. at 606.  
The Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion, 
relying largely on Cousins, in Clark v. Skinner, where 
a truck driver whose left arm was amputated above 
the elbow challenged a different Department of 
Transportation regulation, which required 
commercial drivers to demonstrate proficiency with 
the use of both upper limbs. 937 F.2d 123, 125–26 (4th 
Cir. 1991). Like the First Circuit, the Fourth Circuit 
held that such an action may be maintained, if at all, 
under the APA, and that “the Rehabilitation Act does 
not afford [plaintiff] a private cause of action against 
the Secretary of Transportation.” Id. at 126. As the 
Fourth Circuit explained, the “proper avenue of 
appeal” for such an aggrieved party “is from a final 
administrative decision” pursuant to the APA.3 Id. 
                                            
3 District courts in other circuits have reached conflicting 
results. Compare, e.g., Wilson v. Seattle Hous. Auth., No. 09-226, 
2010 WL 1633323, at *5–6 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 22, 2010) (agreeing 
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One might argue that the First and Fourth 
Circuits’ decisions are distinguishable on the ground 
that they concerned actions undertaken by “the 
government as regulator,” Cousins, 880 F.2d at 605, 
as opposed to alleged discriminatory misconduct by 
government employees. Cf. Doe v. Att’y Gen. of the 
United States, 941 F.2d 780, 793 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The 
APA’s purpose is to provide an administrative forum 
for those challenging administrative and regulatory 
agency action, not to provide a forum for adjudicating 
government tort liability.”), overruled on other 
grounds by Lane, 518 U.S. 187. The Court is not 
persuaded, however, that this distinction holds. 
Whether a suit to enforce Section 504 is treated as 
arising under the Rehabilitation Act or the APA, Lane 
makes clear that the remedies available are the same: 
the plaintiff may only obtain declaratory or injunctive 
relief, not money damages. See Lane, 518 U.S. at 197; 
5 U.S.C. § 702. Any person whose discrimination 
claim can be alleviated by forward-looking relief of 
that nature, moreover, may well have the kind of 
claim that is suited to APA review. At least as a 
general matter, those acts of discrimination that can 
be remedied by forward-looking relief (for instance, by 
a change in the agency’s policies or practices) are 
likely to involve either demands for relief that have 
been formally rejected or established rules or 
procedures that fail to comply with the Act. See 5 
U.S.C. § 551(4)–(11), (13). There is nothing discordant 
about applying the APA to claims of that type.  
                                            
with the First and Fourth Circuits that plaintiffs must proceed 
under the APA), with Am. Council of the Blind v. Astrue, No. 05-
4696, 2008 WL 1858928, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2008) (finding 
“jurisdiction under the Rehabilitation Act”), with Cooke v. 
Bureau of Prisons, 926 F. Supp. 2d 720, 731–32 (E.D.N.C. 2013) 
(declining to reach the issue). 
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The question whether any particular alleged 
violation of Section 504—including the violation 
alleged in Plaintiff’s SFO complaint—will be subject 
to review under the APA is not one the Court needs to 
address today. It is sufficient for present purposes to 
conclude that the Rehabilitation Act does not provide 
an implied cause of action for discrimination in federal 
programs and activities (or for failure to comply with 
administrative procedures), but that the APA 
provides a cause of action to challenge final agency 
action that is not in accordance with the 
Rehabilitation Act. In this action, Plaintiff merely 
challenges the failure of Defendants to respond to his 
administrative complaint in a timely manner. If 
Plaintiff subsequently brings an action under the APA 
relating to allegedly discriminatory conduct during 
the SFO incident and/or the substance of the agency’s 
response, a court can at that time determine whether 
he has identified a final agency action subject to 
review under the APA, whether the alleged final 
agency action is contrary to the Rehabilitation Act, 
and whether any other defense is available.  
2. The Agency Defendants’ Preclusion Defense  
Having concluded that any cause of action that 
Plaintiff may have for an alleged violation of Section 
504’s prohibition against discrimination in federal 
programs or activities arises under the APA, the 
Court must next consider the Agency Defendants’ 
contention that Section 704 of the APA, which 
precludes review of any agency action for which there 
is another “adequate remedy in a court,” 5 U.S.C. § 
704, bars review of Defendants’ delay in responding to 
Plaintiff’s SFO complaint. In support of this 
argument, Defendants rely on a line of decisions 
holding that statutes similar to the Rehabilitation Act 
preclude APA review. See Dkt. 72 at 22–23. Those 
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decisions, however, are inapposite. In each case, the 
Court of Appeals held that an independent statutory 
scheme with a unique remedial structure precluded 
separate resort to the APA. Here, because Plaintiff’s 
cause of action arises under the APA itself, there is no 
independent statutory scheme that implicitly or 
expressly precludes APA review.  
In the first of these cases, Council of and for the 
Blind of Delaware County Valley, Inc. v. Regan, 709 
F.2d 1521, the Court of Appeals considered whether 
plaintiffs could sue the Treasury Department’s Office 
of Revenue Sharing (“ORS”) for failing to comply with 
a statutory timetable for resolving claims of 
discrimination by recipients of federal funding and for 
failing to enforce the relevant restrictions on 
discrimination by those recipients. Congress had 
provided a private right of action that permitted 
private citizens to file an administrative complaint 
with the ORS and then to sue the grant recipient if 
the ORS either (a) failed to issue a determination 
within 90 days or (b) determined that the grant 
recipient had complied with the antidiscrimination 
provision. See id. at 1527. Against that backdrop, the 
Court of Appeals declined to imply a cause of action 
against the ORS under the relevant statute, and 
instead held that Congress intended to permit private 
enforcement only by way of actions against those 
recipients allegedly engaged in discriminatory 
conduct. Id. at 1531. Of more relevance here, the 
Court then held that the statute also precluded relief 
under Section 704 of the APA, because the private 
remedy in the statute—that is, the provision 
permitting plaintiffs to sue the recipients of federal 
funds—was sufficient to remedy the recipients’ 
discriminatory conduct. Id. at 1531–32. In so holding, 
the Court expressly rejected the plaintiffs’ contention 
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that the private right of action was inadequate 
because it did not provide a means of redressing the 
ORS’s own failure to enforce “the statute’s 
nondiscrimination commend.” Id. at 1532. As the 
Court explained, “even if . . . a nationwide suit would 
be more effective than several [suits against funding 
recipients], we hold that the remedy provided by 
Congress is adequate to redress the discrimination 
allegedly encountered by appellants.” Id at 1533 
(emphases in original).  
The second case followed a similar path. There, a 
group of civil-rights organizations filed suit to 
challenge what they saw as the federal government’s 
failure to enforce a number of civil-rights statutes, 
including Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act. See 
Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos (“WEAL”), 
906 F.2d 742, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (R.B. Ginsburg, 
J.).4 They, too, alleged that the recipients of federal 
funds had acted in a discriminatory manner and that 
the agencies had failed to respond to administrative 
complaints about the underlying discrimination. The 
Court held, relying on Council of and for the Blind, 
that neither Title VI nor the other statutes afforded 
the plaintiffs a right of action against the government 
in its role as a monitor of the recipients’ compliance. 
Id. at 749–50. The Court also addressed, and rejected, 
the plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the APA 
                                            
4 The plaintiffs in WEAL sued school districts across the country 
as “recipient[s] of Federal assistance,” and the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare in its role as the “Federal 
provider of such assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). Accordingly, 
although WEAL’s holding applies to the Rehabilitation Act, it 
applies only to the remedial scheme governing violations of the 
Act by the recipients of federal funding and by agencies in their 
roles as the providers of such funding. See Lane, 518 U.S. at 192–
93 (making this distinction).   
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permitted them to sue the government even if Title VI 
(and the other statutes) did not. Id. at 750–51. It 
held—again following Council of and for the Blind—
that Title VI and the Rehabilitation Act precluded 
reliance on the APA, even though the statute did not 
provide a mechanism by which the plaintiffs could 
obtain review of the government’s failure to respond 
to their complaints and commence investigations in a 
timely manner. See id. As the Court of Appeals 
explained, 
Suits directly against the discriminating 
entities may be more arduous, and less effective 
in providing systemic relief, than continuing 
judicial oversight of federal government 
enforcement. But under our precedent, 
situation-specific litigation affords an 
adequate, even if imperfect, remedy. So far as 
we can tell, the suit targeting specific 
discriminatory acts of fund recipients is the 
only court remedy Congress has authorized for 
private parties, situated as plaintiffs currently 
are. 
Id. at 751. 
Neither Council of and for the Blind nor WEAL 
considered whether the availability of a suit for 
declaratory and injunctive relief against a federal 
agency precludes reliance on the APA to challenge 
that agency’s failure to respond to an administrative 
complaint. Cf. El Rio Santa Cruz Neighborhood 
Health Ctr., Inc. v. HHS, 396 F.3d 1265, 1270–71 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (describing these cases as holding 
that “APA review is unavailable where there is a 
private cause of action against a third party otherwise 
subject to agency regulation”). That unresolved issue, 
however, was addressed and resolved in Garcia v. 
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Vilsack, 563 F.3d 519 (D.C. Cir. 2009). There, in 
response to allegations that the Department of 
Agriculture had for years ignored complaints 
regarding its own discriminatory conduct, Congress 
passed a statute permitting eligible complainants 
either to file suit in federal court or to renew their 
administrative complaints. See 563 F.3d at 521–22. 
Those who chose to renew their administrative 
complaints “could seek de novo review in federal 
court” after the agency had adjudicated those 
complaints. Id. at 522. The plaintiffs in Garcia “chose 
the first option,” but also brought APA claims against 
the agency arising out of its failure to investigate their 
prior complaints. Id.  
The Court of Appeals held, following WEAL, that 
the federal statute precluded review of the agency’s 
failure to investigate under the APA by affording the 
plaintiffs a cause of action to challenge the 
discrimination itself. Id. at 523. The fact that the 
plaintiffs “fault [the agency’s] regulation of itself and 
not its regulation of a third party,” the Court of 
Appeals explained, did not render WEAL inapplicable 
to the remedial scheme. Id. at 525. “If anything,” it 
explained, “a[] . . . discrimination claim filed directly 
against the [agency] affords a better remedy than 
those available” against the third parties in prior 
suits. Id. “If successful, a plaintiff can obtain 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the agency 
itself,” which “would presumably deter the agency to 
the same extent as a successful APA claim.” Id. The 
Court of Appeals also rejected the plaintiffs’ efforts to 
identify an independent purpose for their APA suit, 
explaining that “[t]he suggestion that [substantive] 
relief would not vindicate appellants’ interest 
insuring that the [agency] adheres to its duty-to-
investigate regulations”—that is, the plaintiffs’ 
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administrative aim—“was rejected in Council [of and 
for the Blind]. . . and WEAL.” Id.  
The government argues that Garcia, Council of 
and for the Blind, and WEAL control this case. It 
contends that the availability of nonmonetary relief 
under the Rehabilitation Act to remedy a substantive 
violation of Section 504 precludes the use of the APA 
to remedy an administrative violation. But, as the 
Court has explained, the government’s argument 
proceeds from a mistaken premise: that Plaintiff’s 
cause of action arises under the Rehabilitation Act, 
not the APA itself. The distinction is critical. The 
government cites no authority for the proposition that 
the APA can preclude itself—that is, that the 
availability of a substantive remedy under the APA 
may in some circumstances preclude an 
administrative remedy under the APA. Such an 
argument is at odds with a commonsense reading of 
the preclusion provision, which asks whether there is 
some “other” alternative remedy available in court. 
See 5 U.S.C. § 704. It also runs counter to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bowen v. Massachusetts, 
487 U.S. 879 (1988).  
In Bowen, the Supreme Court traced the history of 
the preclusion rule found in Section 704 of the APA. 
See 5 U.S.C. § 704. The Court explained that the 
primary purpose of this statutory provision was to 
make clear “that Congress did not intend the general 
grant of review in the APA to duplicate existing 
procedures for review of agency action,” such as those 
that permitted review of Federal Trade Commission 
and National Labor Relations Board orders in the 
courts of appeals. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 903 (emphasis 
added). That same statutory purpose is identified in 
the authoritative Attorney General’s Manual on the 
Administrative Procedure Act 95 (1947), which 
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explained: “The net effect, clearly intended by the 
Congress, is to provide for a dovetailing of the general 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act with 
the particular statutory provisions which the 
Congress has moulded for special situations.” The 
preclusion provision, moreover, should “not be 
construed to defeat the central purpose of providing a 
broad spectrum of judicial review of agency action,” at 
least not in a case in which Congress has not 
established “special statutory procedures” to channel 
review of an agency’s decisionmaking. Bowen, 487 
U.S. at 903. That is what has happened here: while 
Congress has specified exactly what remedies a 
plaintiff has to vindicate his or her rights under the 
Rehabilitation Act against a recipient of federal 
funding, or even an agency providing such funding, it 
has said nothing about what remedies a plaintiff has 
against an agency that discriminates on the basis of 
disability in a federal program or activity. See Lane, 
518 U.S. at 192–93. In such a circumstance, Bowen 
directs that Section 704’s preclusion provision is 
inapplicable.  
Moreover, to the extent that Garcia, Council of and 
for the Blind, and WEAL turned on the fact that the 
statutory schemes considered in those cases did not 
require plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative 
remedies—and therefore the plaintiffs did not require 
an agency decision before proceeding to court—there 
is at least a question whether such a rationale would 
extend here. Although there is no exhaustion 
requirement in the APA, see Darby v. Cisneros, 590 
U.S. 137, 146–47 (1993), a plaintiff is entitled to 
review only of “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704; see 
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). The Court need 
not, and does not, decide what would constitute “final 
agency action” in the context of an alleged violation of 
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Section 504 or, indeed, precisely what agency “rule, 
order, license, sanction, relief or the equivalent 
thereof, or failure to act,” see 5 U.S.C. § 551(13), 
Plaintiff might seek to challenge under the APA. Cf. 
J.L., 971 F.2d at 265 (“If a court’s intervention is 
required in the form of an APA suit, a Rehabilitation 
Act suit or both, its decision should be informed by a 
considerable body of information about the 
administration of the SSI program and SSA’s internal 
organization and operations.”). For present purposes, 
the Court merely concludes that the final agency 
action requirement under the APA implicates many of 
the same purposes as an exhaustion requirement and, 
as a result, Defendants’ delay in responding to 
Plaintiff’s complaint could well pose a barrier to any 
substantive claim that Plaintiff might ultimately seek 
to pursue—particularly to the extent that any such 
claim might rely on an asserted failure of DHS to 
redress a grievance expressed in that complaint.  
The Court therefore concludes that the Agency 
Defendants’ preclusion defense fails, and DENIES 
their motion to dismiss to the extent that Plaintiff 
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief arising out of 
their failure to timely process his SFO administrative 
complaint.  
3. 180-Day Requirement  
With respect to Count I of the complaint, the only 
remaining question is whether the Court should 
“compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 
unreasonably delayed” under Section 706 of the APA. 
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). “[A] claim under § 706(1) can 
proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency 
failed to take a discrete agency action that it is 
required to take.” Norton, 542 U.S. at 64 (emphasis in 
original). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have 
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failed to respond to his SFO complaint in the 180-day 
timeframe set out in the governing regulations. See 6 
C.F.R. § 15.70(g)(1). The Agency Defendants do not 
deny that they have failed to respond to the complaint. 
Nor do they dispute that the response Plaintiff seeks 
is a “discrete agency action” that they are “required to 
take.” Indeed, the Agency Defendants mount no 
defense of their failure to respond to Plaintiff’s SFO 
complaint whatsoever, except to assert that Plaintiff 
has no cause of action by which to hold them 
accountable. Because the Court disagrees with that 
premise, it will proceed to the merits of Plaintiff’s 
motion for partial summary judgment.  
First, the Agency Defendants’ failure to act is the 
kind of discrete and mandatory action that the 
Supreme Court described in Norton. See 542 U.S. at 
64. There, the Supreme Court illustrated the 
governing law with an example analogous to the 
present case, explaining that a statutory provision 
that required an agency “‘to establish regulations to 
implement’ interconnection requirements ‘[w]ithin 6 
months’ of the date of the enactment of the [statute] 
would . . . support[] a judicial decree under the APA 
requiring the prompt issuance of regulations.” Id. at 
64–65 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(1)). The fact that 
the deadline Plaintiff seeks to enforce in this case is 
set out in a regulation, not a statute, is immaterial; 
the Norton Court explained that an agency could be 
compelled to follow “agency regulations that have the 
force of law.” Id. at 65. Defendants’ failure to respond 
to Plaintiff’s complaint is, therefore, the appropriate 
subject of a suit under Section 706(1).  
The question, then, is whether the Agency 
Defendants’ delay is “unreasonable” under the APA. 
Although “[t]here is no per se rule as to how long is too 
long to wait for agency action,” In re American Rivers 
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& Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court of 
Appeals has, in a series of cases beginning with 
Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. 
FCC (“TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 
outlined six factors to guide courts in determining 
whether relief under Section 706(1) is warranted. 
“The first and most important factor is that ‘the time 
agencies take to make decisions must be governed by 
a rule of reason.’” In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 
849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting TRAC, 740 F.2d at 
80). The remaining five factors are: 
(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or 
other indication of the speed with which it 
expects the agency to proceed in the enabling 
statute, that statutory scheme may supply 
content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that 
might be reasonable in the sphere of economic 
regulation are less tolerable when human 
health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court 
should consider the effect of expediting delayed 
action on agency activities of a higher or 
competing priority; (5) the court should also 
take into account the nature and extent of the 
interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court 
need not find any impropriety lurking behind 
agency lassitude in order to hold that agency 
action is “unreasonably delayed.” 
Id. (quoting In re United Mine Works of Am. Int’l Union, 
190 F.3d 545, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ delay (now 
verging on three years) is “prima facie unreasonable” 
in light of the 180-day deadline. Dkt. 7 at 1. But the 
question is not that simple. As one commentator has 
observed, the cases that address agencies’ failure to 
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comply with statutory deadlines “fall along the 
spectrum of judicial responses,” with some requiring 
strict compliance and others permitting dramatic 
deviation. 2 Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law 
Treatise § 12.3 (5th ed. 2010). The Court of Appeals 
has both denied claims of undue delay under Section 
706(1) when agencies have missed the mark by much 
more time than Defendants have here, see Grand 
Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 476 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (no remedy under Section 706(1) where 
Congress required agency to promulgate regulations 
within 120 days and regulations were not issued for 
ten years), and granted relief under Section 706(1) in 
cases of delay roughly analogous to the case before the 
Court, see MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 
322, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (explaining that the 
Telecommunications Act “assumes that rates will be 
finally decided within a reasonable time 
encompassing months, occasionally a year or two, but 
not several years or a decade”). The key question, 
under the APA and TRAC, is whether the delay is 
“reasonable” in light of the evidence in the record.  
The problem before the Court is that there is no 
evidence in the record regarding the reasons behind 
the Agency Defendants’ failure to respond to 
Plaintiff’s SFO complaint. In both their initial 
opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary 
judgment, Dkt. 24, and in a supplemental opposition 
that the Court permitted them to file, Dkt. 60, the 
Agency Defendants do no more than reiterate their 
arguments as to why Plaintiff lacks a cause of action 
to compel them to respond to his complaint. As a 
result, the record is devoid of evidence or arguments 
that would justify Defendants’ failure to respond to 
Plaintiff’s complaint.  
Although the question is not as simple as Plaintiff 
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represents, the Court ultimately agrees that 
Defendants’ 2.75-year delay in responding to his SFO 
complaint is “unreasonable” under TRAC. As a basic 
matter, and as the Agency Defendants concede, they 
have failed for almost three years to process an 
administrative complaint that, by regulation, they 
were required to have processed in 180 days. See 6 
C.F.R. § 15.70(g)(1). It is difficult to envision the “rule 
of reason” that would permit an agency routinely to 
delay the processing of administrative complaints by 
a factor of five times the timetable set out in the 
agency’s governing regulations—and Defendants 
have offered no justification or explanation here. 
Moreover, Plaintiff’s interest in the timely processing 
of the complaint is not insubstantial. See TRAC, 750 
F.2d at 80. He alleges in his complaint that he has 
suffered mistreatment “at multiple airports over 
multiple years, including in the nearly two years since 
the SFO incident happened.” Dkt. 1 at 48 n.2 
(emphasis in original). To the extent that Plaintiff has 
a right to be free of discrimination in the airport and 
has asked the agency to remedy such discrimination, 
the agency’s delay in responding to his complaint has 
the effect of perpetuating the alleged wrong.  
Moreover, it is plain even from the record before 
the Court that many of the factors that ordinarily 
militate against Section 706(1) relief are not present 
here. First, the relief Plaintiff seeks does not—as 
many cases do—seem to present the kind of “complex 
scientific, technological, and policy questions” that 
may arise when the relief sought is the promulgation 
of a regulation or a policy. See Action on Smoking & 
Health v. Dep’t of Labor, 100 F.3d 991, 993 (D.C. Cir. 
1996); see also Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, 
Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(observing that the Section 706(1) determination “will 
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depend in large part . . . upon the complexity of the 
task at hand”); In re United Mine Workers, 190 F.3d 
at 555 (“It is difficult for us to second-guess this 
projection in light of the host of complex scientific and 
technical issues involved . . . .” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). All Plaintiff seeks is a response to a 
complaint—a response that might be eight pages (the 
length of DHS’s response to his BOS complaint) or 
less. Second, while TRAC instructs reviewing courts 
to “consider the effect of expediting delayed action on 
agency activities of a higher or competing priority,” 
750 F.2d at 80, there is no basis to conclude that 
DHS’s delay in responding to Plaintiff’s 
administrative complaint is the product of “higher or 
competing priorit[ies].” After all, DHS responded to 
Plaintiff’s BOS complaint in March 2015—over nine 
months ago—but has still not responded to Plaintiff’s 
SFO complaint, which was filed only two months 
later. This is thus not a case in which a plaintiff is 
seeking to upend a “first-in, first-out” procedure by 
attempting to “automatically go to the head of the line 
at the agency.” See Open Am. v. Watergate Special 
Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 614–15 (D.C. Cir. 
1976). Thus, on the current record, “the agency [has] 
not show[n] due diligence in processing plaintiff’s 
individual request.” Id. at 615.  
The Court is sympathetic to the difficulties that 
agencies encounter when they are tasked with 
meeting the kinds of timetables that the regulation on 
which Plaintiff relies impose. And it has no desire to 
micromanage DHS’s efforts to process administrative 
complaints, here or in the future. But this is an 
unusual case: Plaintiff has demonstrated that the 
agency has exceeded the deadline it has set for itself 
five times over, and the agency has provided no reason 
why it should be excused from complying with the 
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deadline. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s 
motion for partial summary judgment in part (with 
respect to the SFO complaint) and DENIES it in part 
(with respect to the BOS complaint). In an 
accompanying Order, the Court will direct the Agency 
Defendants to produce a response to the SFO 
complaint within a reasonable time, and no later than 
January 22, 2016.  
B. The Remaining Counts  
The Court next considers the motions to dismiss 
filed by both the Agency Defendants (Dkt. 23) and the 
individual defendants in their personal capacities 
(collectively, the “Individual Defendants”) (Dkt. 63). 
In these motions, Defendants assert a number of 
defenses to the array of tort claims that Plaintiff has 
pled arising out of their failure to timely process his 
administrative complaint. In particular, Defendants 
argue that (1) the Westfall Act requires that the 
United States be substituted for the Individual 
Defendants as to the majority of Plaintiff’s claims; (2) 
the FTCA requires the dismissal of all of the tort 
claims against the United States, as Plaintiff has 
failed to exhaust them; and (3) the remaining claims 
against Individual Defendants sound neither in 
Bivens nor in any other cause of action. The Court 
agrees.  
As a threshold matter, Count IV of Plaintiff’s 
Complaint alleges that defense counsel has 
“multipl[ied] proceedings unreasonably and 
vexatiously” in this case and requests sanctions under 
28 U.S.C. § 1927. Dkt. 1 at 12. But Plaintiff provides 
no relevant support for his claim of unreasonable 
conduct “in any case” brought “in any court of the 
United States,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the Court 
sees no basis whatsoever for the imposition of 
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sanctions. See Patton Boggs, LLP v. Chevron Corp., 
825 F. Supp. 2d 35, 42 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he bar for 
the imposition of fees and costs under § 1927 is 
extremely high.”). The Court therefore construes 
Count IV as a motion for sanctions and DENIES it. 
The remaining counts in Plaintiff’s complaint 
allege an array of tort claims against ten named and 
additional unnamed defendants, ranging from John 
Pistole, the former administrator of the TSA, to the 
DHS officials who handled his administrative 
complaints. See Dkt. 1 at 5–6. Count II alleges that all 
of the Individual Defendants are liable under Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, for 
violating Plaintiff’s “civil rights”—seemingly his 
rights under the Rehabilitation Act and DHS 
regulations. Count III appears to allege claims for 
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress against all of the Individual Defendants. 
Count V alleges that several Individual Defendants—
Zachary Bromer, Jeremy Buzzell, Erika Lucas, and 
several unnamed defendants—“obstructed the 
investigation of [Plaintiff’s] Rehabilitation Act 
complaints.” Dkt. 1 at 13. Count VI alleges standalone 
claims of civil conspiracy against all of the Individual 
Defendants who were involved in handling Plaintiff’s 
administrative complaints.  
Plaintiff thus brings two kinds of claims against 
the Individual Defendants: tort claims premised upon 
violations of state law (Counts III, V, and VI), and tort 
claims premised on violations of statutory or 
constitutional law (Count II). The problem for 
Plaintiff, as Defendants observe, is that the FTCA 
provides the exclusive remedy for the first set of 
claims, and Plaintiff has no remedy for the second. 
Accordingly, the Court will also grant Defendants’ 
motions to dismiss Counts II, III, V, and VI.  
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1. Westfall Act Substitution  
Defendants first move to substitute the United 
States for the Individual Defendants under the 
Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort 
Compensation Act of 1988, commonly known as the 
Westfall Act. See Dkt. 78 at 9. The Westfall Act 
“accords federal employees absolute immunity from 
common-law tort claims arising out of acts they 
undertake in the course of their official duties.” 
Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 229 (2007); see 
Wuterich, 562 F.3d at 380. In pertinent part, the Act 
provides: 
Upon certification by the Attorney General that 
the defendant employee was acting within the 
scope of his office or employment at the time of 
the incident out of which the claim arose, any 
civil action or proceeding commenced upon such 
claim in a United States district court shall be 
deemed an action against the United States 
under the provisions of this title and all 
references thereto, and the United States shall 
be substituted as the party defendant. 
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). The effect of a certification 
under the Act, in short, is to “convert[] [a] tort suit into 
a[n] FTCA action,” subject to all of the exceptions and 
procedural requirements that accompany that 
statute. Wuterich, 562 F.3d at 380. 
Here, the Attorney General’s delegate has attested 
that the Individual Defendants “were acting in their 
scope of their employment at the time of the 
allegations stated in the Complaint.” Dkt. 23-1. 
Although a plaintiff may contest a scope-of-
employment certification, see Gutierrez de Martinez 
v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 420 (1995), Plaintiff has not 
done so. Instead, he argues only that the Westfall Act 
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permits substitution only to the extent the Individual 
Defendants were sued in their official (rather than 
their personal) capacities. Dkt. 74 at 36. But, as the 
Court has previously noted, “an official-capacity suit 
is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a 
suit against the [agency]” rather than the named 
defendant. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 
166 (1985). Plaintiff’s claims against the Individual 
Defendants in their personal capacities, by contrast, 
are labeled as such because they would (if successful) 
impose personal liability on them. The substitution 
mechanism in the Westfall Act seeks to shield 
government employees from such a prospect, at least 
when they act within the scope of their employment. 
See Osborn, 549 U.S. at 229. Here, Plaintiff has 
provided no evidence that the Individual Defendants 
were not acting within the scope of their employment 
at the time they processed his complaints, and he 
cannot evade the Westfall Act in any other way. 
Plaintiff also appears to argue, Dkt. 74 at 36–37, 
that Count II of his Complaint, which purports to 
bring a Bivens claim, falls within the Westfall Act’s 
exceptions for claims “brought for a violation of the 
Constitution of the United States” or “a statute of the 
United States under which such action against an 
individual is otherwise authorized.” 28 U.S.C. § 
2679(b)(2); see also Osborn, 549 U.S. at 159. The 
Court agrees. Congress intended to preserve Bivens 
suits as a procedural mechanism for plaintiffs alleging 
constitutional torts by federal officers, and did not 
intend to replace all preexisting statutory remedies 
with the FTCA. See United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 
160, 166–67 (1991) (“[T]he FTCA is not the exclusive 
remedy for torts committed by Government employees 
in the scope of their employment when an injured 
plaintiff brings . . . a Bivens action . . . or . . . an action 
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under a federal statute that authorizes recovery 
against a Government employee.”); Simpkins v. 
District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 366, 371–72 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not fall 
within this exception because he cannot maintain a 
damages action for their failure to process his 
administrative complaint, Dkt. 78 at 10–11, but this 
argument goes to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, not 
the propriety of Westfall Act substitution.  
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 
motion to substitute the United States for the 
Individual Defendants with respect to Counts III, V, 
and VI, and DENIES it with respect to Count II. The 
Court will discuss these counts further below.  
2. FTCA Claims (Counts III, V, and VI)  
Defendants argue that the Court, having 
substituted the United States for the Individual 
Defendants and “convert[ed] [Plaintiff’s] tort suit into 
a[n] FTCA action,” Wuterich, 562 F.3d at 380, must 
now dismiss Plaintiff’s tort claims against the United 
States. They argue that all three tort counts should be 
dismissed without prejudice on the basis of Plaintiff’s 
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Dkt. 
62 at 10. They also suggest that, for various reasons, 
the Court could dismiss each count with prejudice. See 
Dkt. 62 at 10 n.6 (arguing that, to the extent that 
Count III sounds in “abuse of process,” the FTCA 
explicitly does not waive the United States’s sovereign 
immunity against such a claim); Dkt. 63 at 16–18 
(arguing that Counts V and VI do not make out 
plausible claims). The Court agrees with Defendants 
that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed on the 
basis of his failure to exhaust his administrative 
remedies, and therefore declines to reach Defendants’ 
additional arguments.  
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The FTCA precludes a claim for damages arising 
out of “the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 
employee of the Government . . . unless the claimant 
shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate 
Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally 
denied by the agency in writing.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 
Plaintiff did not file an FTCA claim with DHS before 
filing suit. See Dkt. 26. At an earlier stage in the 
proceedings, Plaintiff moved the Court to stay 
proceedings on his FTCA claims while he exhausted 
his remedies. Id. As the Court explained in its earlier 
opinion, there is considerable authority for the 
proposition that “[t]he plain language of the FTCA . . 
. unambiguously ‘bars a plaintiff from filing suit 
before he or she has exhausted . . . administrative 
remedies,’” a failure that “cannot be remedied by . . . 
attempting to exhaust while the suit is pending.” Sai, 
99 F. Supp. 3d at 62–63 (quoting Edwards v. District 
of Columbia, 616 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C. 2009)). 
The Court has no need to resolve the question, 
however, as Plaintiff now concedes that his FTCA 
claims should be dismissed. See Dkt. 72 at 35. The 
Court of Appeals has made clear that, under such a 
circumstance, a dismissal should be without 
prejudice, so that an FTCA plaintiff can exhaust his 
administrative remedies and then proceed. See 
Simpkins, 108 F.3d at 371 (“[F]orcing these cases 
through the administrative process helps sort out not 
only worthless claims, but also worthy ones, which 
may be settled at that stage.”). The Court will, 
accordingly, dismiss Counts III, V, and VI without 
prejudice.  
3. Statutory / Bivens Claims (Count II)  
Defendants finally argue that Count II of 
Plaintiff’s complaint, which purports to bring a claim 
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 
 47a
U.S. 388, against the Individual Defendants, should 
be dismissed with prejudice because there is no 
Bivens remedy available to Plaintiff. The Court notes, 
as a threshold matter, that Count II is styled as a 
claim against Defendants arising out of their violation 
of Plaintiff’s statutory rights—that is, his rights 
under “the Rehabilitation Act, and DHS’ 
implementing regulations.” Dkt. 1 at 11. But no 
matter how Count II is styled, the Court agrees with 
Defendants that it must be dismissed for failure to 
allege a cause of action.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens 
“recognized an implied private cause of action for 
damages against federal officials who violate the 
Fourth Amendment.” Klay v. Panetta, 758 F.3d 369, 
372 (D.C. Cir. 2014).5 But in the decades since Bivens, 
both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have 
“proceeded cautiously in implying additional federal 
causes of action for money damages.” Meshal v. 
Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
The Individual Defendants argue vigorously that the 
Court should decline to infer a Bivens remedy arising 
out of agency delay, see Dkt. 63 at 18–19, 21–25, and 
the Court agrees that there is no basis for a Bivens 
claim here. It is established that a Bivens remedy 
exists, if at all, to “remedy . . . constitutional 
violations.” Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 704 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). But the Court of Appeals 
has made clear that there is no violation of the Due 
Process Clause arising out of an agency’s failure to 
                                            
5 A private party cannot bring a Bivens action against a federal 
agency. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994). Thus to the 
extent Count II could be construed to plead a Bivens claim 
against the Agency Defendants, it is dismissed with prejudice on 
that ground. 
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process discrimination complaints in a timely 
manner. See Council of and for the Blind, 709 F.2d at 
1533. Because Plaintiff can point to no constitutional 
violation that allegedly occurred during DHS’s 
processing of his administrative complaints, he 
cannot invoke Bivens against any of the officers who 
processed them. Nor, to the extent Plaintiff’s 
complaint can be construed as stating claims against 
any of the Individual Defendants arising under a 
statute, could such a claim be viable. Bivens does not 
extend to statutory violations. See Wilson, 535 F.3d at 
704. And to the extent that Plaintiff seeks money 
damages from the federal officers who processed his 
complaint, he is without a remedy, as neither the APA 
nor the Rehabilitation Act establishes a damages 
remedy against federal officers. As Plaintiff concedes, 
moreover, to the extent that his complaint can be read 
as stating claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
statutory violations, such claims also would not be 
viable, as § 1983 only extends to state and local 
officers. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 
418, 424 (1973); see also Dkt. 72 at 36. In sum, 
Plaintiff has stated no viable statutory claim for 
damages against the Individual Defendants.  
Having concluded that (1) Plaintiff’s tort claims 
against the Individual Defendants must proceed, if at 
all, against the United States under the FTCA and 
after Plaintiff exhausts his administrative remedies, 
and (2) Plaintiff cannot pursue Bivens claims against 
the Individual Defendants arising out of the agency’s 
delay in processing his administrative complaints, the 
Court GRANTS Individual Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.  
C. Plaintiff’s Motions  
The Court now turns to the two remaining motions 
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filed by Plaintiff: his motion for leave to file an 
amended complaint, Dkt. 73, and his renewed motion 
to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. 66. (The Court has 
previously discussed, and denied, Plaintiff’s pending 
motion for partial summary judgment, Dkt. 7, and his 
pending motion for discovery under Rule 56(d), Dkt. 
72 at 38.) For the following reasons, the Court will 
deny Plaintiff’s motions.  
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended 
Complaint  
Plaintiff has moved for leave to file an amended 
complaint. See Dkt. 73. To the extent Plaintiff seeks 
to add claims relating to events that occurred after the 
filing of his original complaint—such as DHS’s failure 
to respond to Plaintiff’s appeal of the denial of his 
administrative complaint—the Court notes that his 
motion is better construed as a motion to file a 
supplemental pleading under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(d). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). But “the 
distinction is in most instances of little moment,” 
United States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 385 (D.C. Cir. 
2002), and has no bearing on this case, because both 
motions for leave to amend and motions to 
supplement should be denied where amendment (or 
supplementation) would be futile. Wildearth 
Guardians v. Kempthorne, 592 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23 
(D.D.C. 2008). Plaintiff’s proposed amended 
complaint purports to “drop[] [his] FTCA claims” 
(although it retains all tort claims against Individual 
Defendants); to “add[] a claim” under the 
Rehabilitation Act and the APA for Defendants’ 
alleged failure to timely respond to Plaintiff’s appeal 
of DHS’s denial of his administrative complaints; and 
to “clarif[y] [his] APA claims” by making clear that 
Count I is pled under the APA as well as the 
Rehabilitation Act (and under § 706(2) as well as § 
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706(1)). See Dkt. 73 at 1; Dkt. 73-1 at 8–13. 
Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion on various 
grounds. They argue that it is unnecessary for 
Plaintiff to amend his complaint to drop his FTCA 
claims, because he has already consented to their 
dismissal, and that it would be futile to add any claim 
arising out of DHS’s processing of Plaintiff’s appeal of 
his administrative complaint, whether under the APA 
or the Rehabilitation Act, because neither statute 
permits Plaintiff to challenge agency delay. See Dkt. 
78 at 17–20. 
The Court agrees that it would be unnecessary or 
futile to permit Plaintiff to amend or supplement his 
complaint. Although “the court should freely give 
leave when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(a)(2), it is well established that leave to amend 
should be denied when amendment would be futile. 
See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); 
Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 999, 
1003 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s principal reason for 
seeking leave to amend his complaint is to add a claim 
arising out of DHS’s alleged failure to timely process 
his appeal of the denial of his BOS complaint. But 
DHS has now processed his appeal, see Dkt. 78-1, and 
so the claim Plaintiff seeks to add is moot for the same 
reasons that his original claims relating to his BOS 
complaint are moot. Nor is there any need for Plaintiff 
to amend his complaint to “drop” his FTCA claims or 
to “clarify” his APA claims, given the Court’s 
conclusions that his FTCA claims must be dismissed 
and that his APA claims were pled with sufficient 
clarity in the original complaint.  
The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for 
leave to amend his complaint on the ground that the 
proposed amendments would be futile or unnecessary.  
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3. Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion to Proceed In Forma 
Pauperis  
At the commencement of the litigation, Plaintiff 
sought in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. Dkt. 3. At 
that time, he swore “under penalty of perjury” that he 
could not afford a lawyer and that he was a 
“beneficiary of a state-based system for low income 
persons,” but he refused, “as a matter of principle and 
to preserve [his] standing in a forthcoming Supreme 
Court certiorari petition,” to submit an affidavit 
containing “any details of [his] personal finances, 
state benefits, or similarly private matters on the 
public record merely because [he was seeking] IFP 
status.” Id. at 1. Finally, Plaintiff stated that he was 
willing to file the required affidavit under seal and ex 
parte. Id. Recognizing, however, that the Court of 
Appeals had recently rejected a similar application by 
Plaintiff in a different case, Sai v. U.S. Postal Service, 
No. 14-1005 (D.C. Cir. filed Jan. 7, 2014), and that, as 
a result, any appeal would be unlikely to prevail, 
Plaintiff also submitted a check for the required filing 
fee “in case this Court” were to deny Plaintiff’s 
application for lack of sufficient support. Id. at 2. The 
Court denied Plaintiff’s IFP motion “without prejudice 
for failure to meet the statutory requirements of 28 
U.S.C. § 1915.” Jan. 30, 2015 Minute Order.  
Following this Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion, 
the Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s petition for a 
writ of certiorari, which sought review of the Court of 
Appeals’s decision to deny his IFP application under 
similar, although not identical, circumstances. Sai v. 
U.S. Postal Service, 135 S. Ct. 1915 (2015). At that 
point, Plaintiff once again filed a motion with this 
Court, renewing his prior IFP application or, in the 
alternative, seeking reconsideration of the Court’s 
prior ruling. Dkt. 65. At the same time, Plaintiff 
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requested that the Court certify the issue for 
interlocutory appeal. Id. Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s 
motion on the grounds that Plaintiff’s application fails 
to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which requires that 
a person seeking IFP status submit an affidavit 
setting forth the person’s assets and demonstrating 
an inability to pay the filing fee; Plaintiff previously 
litigated and lost this issue in the Court of Appeals; 
Plaintiff has failed to specify any specific reasons 
justifying his request to file under seal and ex parte; 
and, in any event, the interest in public access 
outweighs any interest in nondisclosure. Dkt. 67. 
Defendants also oppose interlocutory review. Id.  
Plaintiff’s brief is over ten pages long, and it 
touches on issues including whether IFP affidavits are 
“ministerial” or “judicial” documents, whether the 
First Amendment right of access applies, and whether 
Defendants have standing to oppose the motion. But 
neither Plaintiff’s brief nor the accompanying 
affidavit provides any explanation of why or how 
disclosure of the required information would cause 
Plaintiff any unique or identifiable harm. Rather, 
Plaintiff’s position is apparently premised on a matter 
of principle—he simply he asserts that his right to 
access to the courts “will be chilled” if he is required 
to disclose the required information and that he 
“absolutely refuse[s] to waive [his] privacy rights or 
[to] subject [himself] to the risks from public 
disclosure of [his] affidavit.” Dkt. 65 at 17 (emphasis 
in original). He further states that he also “absolutely 
refuse[s] to provide such information to the 
defendants in this case,” unless subject “to a subpoena 
with opportunity for a motion to quash.” Dkt. 65-1 ¶ 
12.  
Against this backdrop, the Court need not decide 
whether an IFP affidavit is a “judicial record” or how 
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the rights of public access derived from the First 
Amendment and the common law would apply to it. 
See, e.g., In re Boston Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174 (1st 
Cir. 2003); United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 
163 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Section 1915 requires the 
submission of a detailed affidavit, and, under the 
Court’s practice these submissions, like other filings, 
are a matter of public record. It is incumbent upon 
Plaintiff to demonstrate why this usual rule should 
not apply in his case, and the unsupported assertion 
of an unqualified interest in privacy is not sufficient. 
Cf. Johnson v. Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp., 951 
F.2d 1268, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“The decision as to 
access to judicial records is one best left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be 
exercised in light of the relevant facts and 
circumstances of the particular case.” (quoting United 
States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 316–17 (D.C. Cir. 
1980)). As Plaintiff points out, the issue he raises 
“affects tens of thousands of similarly situated 
litigants.” Dkt. 65 at 17. If every one of those litigants 
was entitled to file an IFP application under seal and 
ex parte, with no showing of particularized need, the 
public would be denied important transparency in the 
working of the judiciary, opposing parties would be 
deprived of the opportunity to raise objections, and 
the courts would lose a corresponding check on 
potential misstatements or omissions in IFP 
affidavits. Plaintiff’s insistence that he is “absolutely” 
unwilling to share the required information with 
opposing counsel, moreover, is particularly difficult to 
justify. Parties often exchange extraordinarily 
sensitive information in litigation subject to protective 
orders. Yet, here, Plaintiff refuses to disclose his 
finances to Defendants without any explanation of 
how he might be harmed or reason to believe that 
Defendants’ counsel would not maintain the 
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confidentiality of that information.  
Although Plaintiff fails to identify any basis for 
distinguishing his case from the many thousands of 
other cases in which a party seeks IFP status, he 
alludes to a number of generally applicable risks. He 
notes, for example, that disclosure of financial 
affidavits might pose a risk of identity theft. That, of 
course, does not explain why Plaintiff insists on ex 
parte treatment. But, even more fundamentally, it 
does not explain the basis for Plaintiff’s concern. 
Plaintiff is not required to provide account numbers, 
his Social Security number, or any similar 
information. It seems implausible, moreover, that 
identity thieves are likely to peruse IFP applications 
in search of their victims. Nor does Plaintiff’s general 
assertion that the affidavits might “disclose 
embarrassing and potentially harmful information, 
such as an affiant’s family situation, disabilities, [or] 
dependents,” id. at 17, further his argument. If 
Plaintiff has particular reasons why particular 
information should not be disclosed on the public 
docket, he is free to raise that issue with the Court. 
What he cannot do, however, is seek the benefit of IFP 
status while refusing to comply with the relevant 
rules and procedures and declining to offer any 
individualized rationale short of his personal 
conviction that the information at issue should not be 
disclosed.  
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion 
to proceed in forma pauperis, or, in the alternative, for 
leave to file an affidavit in support of his application 
ex parte. Because this Opinion and the accompanying 
Order disposes of all claims in this case, Plaintiff has 
no need for an order certifying the question under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Court therefore DENIES his 
request for certification as moot.  
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III. CONCLUSION  
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS 
Defendants’ motions to dismiss in part and DENIES 
them in part, and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for 
partial summary judgment in part and DENIES it in 
part. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s remaining 
motions. A separate Order will accompany this 
Memorandum Opinion. 
 
/s/ Randolph D. Moss  
RANDOLPH D. MOSS  
United States District Judge  
Date: December 15, 2015 
 
 
